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Both knowledge and social commitments in Multi-Agent Systems (MASs) have long
been under research independently, especially for agent communication. Plenty of work
has been carried out to define their semantics. However, in concrete applications such as
business settings and web-based applications, agents should reason about their knowledge
and their social commitments at the same time, particularly when they are engaged in con-
versations. In fact, studying the interaction between knowledge and social commitments
is still in its beginnings. Therefore, in this thesis, we aim to provide a practical and for-
mal framework that analyzes the interaction between knowledge and communicative social
commitments in MASs from the semantics, model checking, complexity, soundness and
completeness perspectives.
To investigate such an interaction, we, first, combine CTLK (an extension of Com-
putation Tree Logic (CTL) with modality for reasoning about knowledge) and CTLC (an
extension of CTL with modalities for reasoning about commitments and their fulfillments)
in one new logic named CTLKC. By so doing, we identify some paradoxes in the new
logic showing that simply combining current versions of commitment and knowledge log-
ics results in a language of logic that violates some fundamental intuitions. Consequently,
we propose CTLKC+, a new consistent logic of knowledge and commitments that fixes
the identified paradoxes and allows us to reason about social commitments and knowledge
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simultaneously in a consistent manner. Second, we use correspondence theory for modal
logics to prove the soundness and completeness of CTLKC+. To do so, we develop a set of
reasoning postulates in CTLKC+ and correspond them to certain classes of frames. The ex-
istence of such correspondence allows us to prove that the logic generated by any subset of
these postulates is sound and complete, with respect to the models that are based on the cor-
responding frames. Third, we address the problem of model checking CTLKC+ by trans-
forming it to the problem of model checking GCTL∗ (a generalized version of Extended
Computation Tree Logic (CTL∗) with action formulas) and ARCTL (the combination of
CTL with action formulas) in order to respectively use the CWB-NC automata-based model
checker and the extended NuSMV symbolic model checker. Moreover, we prove that the
transformation techniques are sound. Fourth, we analyze the complexity of the proposed
model checking techniques. The results of this analysis reveal that the complexity of our
transformation procedures is PSPACE-complete for local concurrent programs with respect
to the size of these programs and the length of the formula being checked. From the time
perspective, we prove that the complexity of the proposed approaches is P-complete with
regard to the size of the model and length of the formula. Finally, we implement our model
checking approaches and report some experimental results by verifying the well-known
NetBell payment protocol against some desirable properties.
iv
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This chapter provides a motivational introduction to the thesis. It starts by introducing the
scope of the research. Thereafter, it presents the motivations, research problem, objectives
and methodology. Finally, the chapter describes the research structure.
1.1 Scope of Research
Multi-Agent Systems (MASs) paradigm is a popular distributed approach to solve complex
computational problems that are beyond the capabilities of individual software systems.
Typically, a multi-agent system consists of a collection of autonomous and possibly het-
erogenous software agents that interact with each other through communication and coor-
dinate their actions in order to reach their goals [100].
The increasing adoption of MASs in various real life applications, for instance, e-
commerce, e-health and web services [56], highlighted the importance of a large dimension
of agents’ aspects that need to be properly addressed. Among the agents’ units that proved
to have a vital role in the development of effective MASs are knowledge, commitments,
trust, reputation, uncertainty [8, 68]. Each of these significant aspects has been extensively
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studied independently. In this thesis, we focus on the domain of reasoning about knowledge,
communicative social commitments and their interactions in MASs.
1.2 Motivations
In the literature, plenty of research work has been carried out to define the semantic of
knowledge [43, 50, 51, 62] and social commitments [104, 87, 7, 37, 20, 32] independently.
However, in concrete applications such as business settings, agents should reason about
their knowledge and their social commitments at the same time, especially when they are
engaged in conversations [2]. For example, an agent should know what it is committing
about, and should know what the other agent is committing about once this commitment is
made public. In fact, knowledge and commitments are not independent, but influence each
other. Certainly, they should co-exist and interact in any agent-based system. Therefore,
their interaction need to be specified and verified in a systematic way.
In order to motivate our study of modeling, specifying and verifying knowledge and
commitments in a single framework, we use the following situational examples that arise in
practical setting of web-based applications.
Example 1.1. Consider the fish-market protocol [80] in which different agents (one seller
and one or more buyers) are involved in interactions to reach agreement about the price of
the offered fish. The protocol starts when the fisherman delivers the fish to the fish market.
After that, the seller announces the prices of the available buckets of fish. Thereafter, the
buyer(s) either accept the price by uttering Yes or reject the price by uttering No. No re-
sponse from the buyer(s) is also considered as a rejection also. Consequently, if only one
buyer accepts the price, then the seller will sell him, however, if no one accepts, then the
seller lowers the price. On the other hand, if more than one buyer accepts the price, the
seller will increase the price and so on. In such scenarios, when the buyer accepts the price
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(i.e., commits to pay), the seller should know that. Otherwise, the seller will lower the price
even though there is an acceptance. Moreover, the buyer should know that he accepted the
price, which means he has the capability to pay in order to fulfill his commitment.
Example 1.2. Let us take the case of buying a book online from a certain publisher as a
second example. Suppose that we asked a member from our team to buy a book for us
last month. He made the online order and committed to pay. The credit card debit suc-
ceeded, meaning that the agent (our team member) knows that he fulfilled his commitment
to pay. The publishing company committed to send the requested book to our address. Un-
fortunately, the book has never arrived. The publisher claimed she had sent it out, but the
shipping company she dealt with could not find it in their records. As a result, we asked the
publisher to send it again. However, knowing that the book is delivered (i.e., fulfilling the
commitment of delivering the book) will help avoid such situations.
Thus, to address the above shortcomings and capture the interaction between knowl-
edge and social commitments in MASs from the semantic and model checking perspectives,
we need to define a consistent logic that combines these two concepts together and allows
expressing both of them simultaneously.
1.3 Research Problem
In this research, we aim to explore the interaction between knowledge and communicative
social commitments in MASs from the semantics, model checking, complexity, soundness
and completeness perspectives.
In the domain of multi-agent communications, many frameworks have been intro-
duced to specify social commitments [7, 37, 48, 32, 87] and knowledge [51, 62, 43, 95, 26]
independently. However, there is no formal framework and semantics available that allows
3
us to investigate the interaction between these two modalities in MASs.
To address this challenge, we introduce some research questions and name them: Q1,
Q2, . . . etc. We start our research questions by asking the following question: How can we
develop a formal approach that can capture both knowledge and communicative social
commitments simultaneously? [Q1]. As we mentioned earlier, there is no research work
that addresses the issue of reasoning about social commitments and knowledge in MASs
simultaneously. Therefore, we start thinking about how to combine the current available
approaches of knowledge and commitments into one new logic so that properties involving
both of them simultaneously can be expressed. Therefore, we highlight the second research
question: Which logics of knowledge and commitments should we combine? [Q2]. In
this thesis, we combine the CTLK [76] (an extension of CTL [41] with modality for reason-
ing about knowledge) and CTLC [7] (an extension of CTL with modalities for reasoning
about commitments and their fulfillments) logics into one new logic called CTLKC. There
are many reasons that encouraged us to combine these two particular logics. First, the two
logics are extensions of the CTL [41] logic, which has an efficient model checking proce-
dure. Second, their models are defined over the interpreted system formalism [43] and its
extended version [7], which are very suitable to model MASs and agent communication.
Finally, both of them have grounded semantics [99] which means that they can be associ-
ated with computational models. Consequently, we will use the combined logic CTLKC as
a language that expresses a set of postulates that are used to reason about the interaction
between knowledge and social commitments. The third research question of the thesis is
the following: Is it enough to simply combine the current versions of knowledge and
commitment logics in order to obtain a consistent logic? [Q3]. To answer this question,
we introduce a set of postulates combining both knowledge and commitments as they are
currently defined in the literature. The idea is to show that the violation of those postulates
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results in a number of paradoxes in the combined CTLKC logic which shows that simply
combining the current versions of knowledge and commitment logics is not a satisfactory
solution to this complicated problem. A new multi-modal logic is then to be defined. Thus,
the forth research question is: What are the characteristics of the new logic that will
combine knowledge and commitments? [Q4]. The new logic, CTLKC+, should solve
the identified paradoxes in the CTLKC logic and reason about knowledge and social com-
mitment in a consistent manner. The idea is to evaluate it against our fundamental postulates
and criteria of a consistent knowledge and commitment logic. Thereafter, the fifth research
question is: How can we prove the soundness and completeness of the proposed logic?
[Q5]. To address this issue, we use Benthem’s correspondence theory for modal logics [92].
In particular, we develop a set of reasoning postulates using the CTLKC+ logic and corre-
spond them to certain classes of frames. Using correspondence theory, we can prove that
the logic generated by any subset of these postulates is sound and complete with respect
to the models that are based on the corresponding frames. After proving the soundness
and completeness, we need to verify CTLKC+. Therefore, we have the following question:
Which verification approach should we adopt? [Q6]. In this research, we adopt model
checking approach to verify our systems. Model checking is an automated approach that
can verify the whole system model against a given specifications and can establish whether
such specifications are satisfied in this model or not, at design time. To do so, we propose
two transformation (reduction)-based model checking techniques in which the problem of
model checking CTLKC+ is reduced into the problem of model checking GCTL∗ [14] (a
generalized version of CTL∗ [42] with action formulas) and ARCTL [75] ( an extension
of CTL [41] with action formulas). Therefore, we can benefit from the CWB-NC 1 and




need to answer the following research question: What is the cost of the proposed model
checking procedures? [Q7]. To answer this question, we analyze the complexity of the
proposed model checking procedures from the time and space perspectives.
1.4 Research Objectives
The ultimate goal of this research is to develop a formal and comprehensive framework that
can investigate the interaction between knowledge and social commitment in MASs from
the semantics, soundness and completeness, model checking and complexity perspectives.
In particular, we aim to address the following issues:
1. Developing a new consistent logic that can reason about knowledge, communicative
social commitments and their interactions in MASs simultaneously.
2. Proving the soundness and completeness of the proposed logic.
3. Developing an efficient model checking technique for verifying the proposed logic.
4. Computing the computational complexity of the proposed model checking algorithm.
5. Implementing the proposed model checking technique on top of a dedicated model
checker and report some experimental results.
1.5 Methodology
At the beginning of this work, we analyzed the research work carried out in the domain
of agent communication, formal methods using computational logics and reasoning about
knowledge and social commitments in MASs. We have noticed that there are many studies
that tackled the problem of defining the semantics of knowledge [43, 50, 51, 62, 76, 97] and
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social commitments [7, 37, 12, 87, 33] in MASs independently, but none of them tried to
capture the relationship between the two concepts. To capture such a relationship, we have
selected two well-known logics CTLK [76] (an extension of CTL [41] with modality for
reasoning about knowledge) and CTLC [7] (an extension of CTL with modalities for rea-
soning about commitments and their fulfillments) and combined them into one multi-modal
logic, the CTLKC logic, using the independent join [45]. After that, we used the CTLKC
logic to express some reasoning postulates that combine knowledge and commitments in
MASs. After analyzing such postulates, we have identified some paradoxes that should be
addressed in any consistent logic combining knowledge and commitments. Thus, we pro-
pose CTLKC+, a new logic that fixes the identified paradoxes and allows us to reason about
social commitments and knowledge simultaneously, in a consistent manner.
Thereafter, we prove the soundness and completeness of CTLKC+ using Benthem’s
correspondence theory for modal logic [92]. In particular, we develop a set of reasoning
postulates in CTLKC+ and correspond them to certain classes of frames. We illustrate each
reasoning postulate using a concrete application example (the NetBill protocol [90]). The
existence of such correspondence allows us to prove the soundness and completeness of
CTLKC+.
After that, to verify the proposed logic, we first address the problem of model check-
ing CTLKC+ by transforming it into the problem of model checking GCTL∗ [14], a gen-
eralized version of CTL∗ [42] with action formulas. By doing so, we directly benefit from
CWB-NC, the automata-based model checker of GCTL∗. Furthermore, to enhance the scal-
ability of the proposed model checking procedure, we develop another fully-automatic and
transformation-based model checking procedure. Particularly, we transform the problem of
model checking CTLKC+ into the problem of model checking an existing logic of action
called ARCTL [75], an extension of CTL [41] with action formulas. Thus, we get benefit
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from the extended version of NuSMV symbolic model checker of ARCTL. Following that,
we analyze the time and space complexity of the proposed model checking techniques. Fi-
nally, we implement our model checking approaches on top of the extended NuSMV and
CWB-NC model checkers and report verification results for the verification of the NetBill

























































Figure 1.1: The proposed approach
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1.6 Research Structure
The overall structure of this research is depicted in Figure 1.2 as follows. Chapter 1 gives
a motivational introduction. Chapter 2 describes the background needed for our research.
Chapter 3 presents a formal approach for capturing the interaction between knowledge and
social commitments in MASs. Chapter 4 illustrates the usage of Benthem’s correspondence
theory for modal logics to prove the soundness and completeness of the proposed logic of
knowledge and commitments (CTLKC+). Chapter 5 presents two reduction-based proce-
dures to verify CTLKC+ with their implementations. Chapter 6 summarizes the obtained
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In this chapter, we present the necessary preliminaries for this research. In Section 2.1,
we review reasoning about knowledge, knowledge axioms, and how to verify knowledge
in MASs. In Section 2.2, reasoning about social commitments, commitment types, and
commitment applications inMASs is discussed. In Section 2.3, the formalism of interpreted
systems is presented as a tool to model MASs. Section 2.4 reviews the CTLK and CTLC
logics. Thereafter, in Section 2.5, correspondence theory as a formal approach to prove the
soundness and completeness of modal logics is reviewed.. In Section 2.6, model checking
as a verification tool is presented. Section 2.7 describes the related work of this research.
Finally, Section 2.8 summarizes the chapter.
2.1 Reasoning about Knowledge
Knowledge in MASs has long been modeled and reasoned about [43, 94, 73, 51, 62, 95].
Informally, it is captured through the interpretation that an agent knows something (say a
fact) if it is true in all the worlds that the agent thinks possible [52]. Knowledge is formally
11
denoted by Kiϕ meaning that “agent i knows ϕ” where ϕ is the content of knowledge. Fur-
thermore, the logic of knowledge (i.e., epistemic logic) has been successfully applied in
many disciplines (e.g., philosophy and logic [62]). The first formal proposals toward defin-
ing epistemic framework were started by Hintikka [54] and later by Lenzen [60]. Their
efforts were concentrated on defining some axioms of modal logic to capture some proper-
ties of knowledge in a reasonable way. The typical formalism is an S5n system built on top
of the propositional calculus, where n is the number of agents [62]. The traditional axioms
of knowledge are [43]:
• K: (Kip∧Ki(p→ q))→ Kiq,
• T: Kip→ p,
• 4: Kip→ KiKip,
• 5: ¬Kip→ Ki¬Kip,
• D: ¬Ki( f alse)
To capture the semantics of knowledge in epistemic systems, the formalism of Kripke
models [57] was initially introduced. Kripke models are of the form M = (S,{Ri}i∈A,V ),
where S is the set of “possible worlds”, Ri ⊆ S× S is the epistemic accessibility relation
between two possible worlds for each agent i in the set of all agents A , and V : S→ 2p
is a function interpreting a set of propositions [62]. Later, to model the evolution of a sys-
tem composed of autonomous agents and efficiently reason about temporal and epistemic
properties, the “Interpreted systems” formalism was introduced [43]. Details about this
formalism will be given later in Section 2.3.
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2.2 Reasoning about Social Commitments
In an open MASs, to reach their goals, autonomous and heterogeneous agents interact with
each other using Agent Communication Languages (ACLs). Therefore, we need to define
an efficient and formal semantics for those ACLs [31]. The two main approaches for defin-
ing semantics for ACLs are the mental (cognitive) and social approaches. In fact, the first
systematic proposal to define such a semantics was influenced by the Searle’s speech acts
theory [83]. Speech act theory treats communication as actions. This semantics is known as
the mental approach which tries to capture core communication concepts such as: beliefs,
desires, intentions, and goals. However, a major weakness in these approaches is being built
based on the assumption that agents can access each other mind [85]. Therefore, mental
approaches cannot verify whether an agent is acting according to a given semantics. This
problem is commonly known as ACL semantics verification problem [100]. Another draw-
back associated with this kind of semantics is that “it does not allow ACLs to have enough
interoperability among heterogenous agents” [85].
Therefore, MASs switch towards social approaches to overcome the shortcomings
of ACLs semantics defined using mental approaches [87]. Social approaches are hired
to define a formal semantics for ACLs in which no assumptions on the mental states of
agents are made [44, 87, 104]. Social commitments are exploited in some of these social
approaches that successfully provide a robust representation to model multi-agent interac-
tions [87, 49]. In such approaches, commitments are considered as contracts between two
or more autonomous agents to reach an agreement [10].
In the last decade, social commitments have been used successfully in a wide range
of areas (e.g., Web-based applications, business contracts and commitment protocols [89,
30, 5]). Commitment-based social approaches for agent communication have the ability to
treat commitments through a set of actions called “commitment actions”, such as creation,
13
(discharge) fulfillment, violation, cancellation, release, delegation and assignment [86].
This ability to manipulate commitments is in fact an important characteristic that makes
commitment-based approaches flexible and powerful. In this thesis, we use communica-
tive social commitments, introduced in [7], as a means of communication using message
passing. Those commitments are formally expressed asCi→ jϕ which means that the debtor
agent i commits toward the creditor agent j that the content of the commitment ϕ is satisfied
[7].
Example 2.1. A customer (Cus) commits to send a payment (Pay) to a merchant (Mer).
This commitment is formally denoted asCCus→MerPay.
2.3 Interpreted Systems
The formalism of interpreted systems was introduced by Fagin et al. [43] to model the
temporal evolution of a MAS in order to capture epistemic and temporal properties. In-
terpreted systems formalism has the capability to model different classes of MASs such as
synchronous and asynchronous systems [36].
This formalism consists of a set of n agents A = {1, . . . ,n}. Each agent i ∈ A
is described by a set of local states Li. Each local state of an agent represents a given
moment of information for the system. The local state of agent i is denoted by li ∈ Li. A
global state g ∈ G is a state that consists of the local states of all agents in the system (i.e.,
g= (l1, . . . , ln)). The set of all global states G= L1×·· ·×Ln is the Cartesian product of all
local states of n agents. The local state of each agent i in the global state g is characterized
by the notion li(g). The set of initial global states of the system is represented by I ⊆ G.
In this formalism, the set of local actions of each agent i, which is needed to model the
temporal evolution of the system, is denoted by Acti. Pi : L→ 2
Acti represents the local
protocol of agent i which shows the set of available actions that could be carried out at a
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given local state. The global transition function of the system can be defined as follows:
τ : G×ACT → G, where ACT = Act1×·· ·×Actn and each component a ∈ ACT is a joint
action (i.e., an action for each agent). τi is a local transition function for each agent i that
points out the transitions between its local states and it is defined as follows: τi : Li×Acti→
Li.
Bentahar et al. [7] and El-Menshawy et al. [36] extended the formalism of inter-
preted systems to capture communication between interacting agents during the execution
of MASs. In their extension, they associated each agent with a set of variables (communi-
cation channels) such that for the two agents i and j, in order to communicate, they should
share a variable (communication channel).
2.4 CTLK and CTLC logics
In this section, we present the models, syntax and semantics of CTLK [76] and CTLC [7]
logics, which are the combination of branching time CTL [41] with modalities for reasoning
about knowledge and social commitments.
The model (MK ) of CTLK is defined as follows [76]:
Definition 2.1 (Model of CTLK). A model MK = (S, I,Rt ,{≈i |i ∈ A },V ) which is a
member of the set of all modelsM is a tuple, where:
• S⊆ L1×·· ·×Ln is the set of reachable global states for the system.
• I ⊆ S is a set of initial global states for the system.
• Rt ⊆ S×S is the transition relation between two global states s and s
′ in the system.
• ≈i⊆ S×S is the epistemic accessibility relation denoted by s≈i s
′ iff li(s) = li(s
′).
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• V : S→ 2Φp is a valuation function, where Φp = {p,q, ...} and p,q, ... are atomic
propositions.
The epistemic accessibility relation ≈i is an equivalence relation, which means:
• ≈i is reflexive: for each i ∈A , we have s≈i s for all s ∈ S.
• ≈i is symmetric: for each i ∈A , if s≈i s
′ then s′ ≈i s for all s,s
′ ∈ S.
• ≈i is transitive: for each i ∈A , if s≈i s
′ and s′ ≈i s
′′ then s≈i s
′′ for all s,s′,s′′ ∈ S.
The syntax of CTLK, in BNF format, is defined as follows [76]:
Definition 2.2 (Syntax of CTLK).
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ϕ | EXϕ | E(ϕUϕ) | EGϕ | Kiϕ
Where:
• p ∈Φp;
• The boolean connectives ¬, and ∨ are defined in the usual way;
• E is the existential quantifier on paths;
• X , U , and G are CTL “path modal connectives” which stand for “next”, “until”, and
“globally” respectively; and
• The modal connective Ki stands for “knowledge for agent i”.
In this logic, Kiϕ is read as “agent i knows ϕ”. For the other modalities, e.g., F
(future), and A (universal path quantifier), they can be defined as usual (see for example
[24]).
A path pi = (s0,s1, . . .) in a model MK is an infinite sequence of reachable global
states in S such that (si,si+1) ∈ Rt for all i≥ 0 [4]. Π(s) represents the set of all paths that
starts from a given global state s [36].
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Definition 2.3 (Satisfaction of CTLK).
The satisfaction of a CTLK formula ϕ in the model MK at the global state s, denoted by
(MK ,s) |= ϕ , is defined recursively as follows [76]:
• (MK ,s) |= p iff p ∈ V (s);
• (MK ,s) |= ¬ϕ iff (MK ,s) 2 ϕ;
• (MK ,s) |= ϕ ∨ψ iff (MK ,s) |= ϕ or (MK ,s) |= ψ;
• (MK ,s) |= EXϕ iff ∃ pi ∈Π(s) such that (MK ,pi(1)) |= ϕ;
• (MK ,s) |=E(ϕUψ) iff ∃ pi ∈Π(s) such that ∃ k≥ 0, (MK ,pi(k)) |=ψ and (MK ,pi( j)) |=
ϕ for all 0≤ j < k;
• (MK ,s) |= EGϕ iff ∃ pi ∈Π(s) such that ∀ k ≥ 0 (MK ,pi(k)) |= ϕ;
• (MK ,s) |= Kiϕ iff for ∀ s
′ ∈ S such that s≈i s
′, (MK ,s
′) |= ϕ .
Since CTLK extends CTL [41] with modality for reasoning about knowledge, CTLK
has the same semantics of CTL in addition to the modal operator of knowledge. In this
logic, the formula Kiϕ holds in the model MK at state s iff ϕ is satisfied in all accessible
state s′ obtained by ≈i [76].
The model (MC ) of CTLC is defined as follows [7]:
Definition 2.4 (Model of CTLC). A model MC = (S, I,Rt ,{∼i→ j |(i, j) ∈A
2},V ) which
is a member of the set of all modelsM is a tuple, where:
• S, I,Rt and V are the same as in Definition 2.1.
• ∼i→ j⊆ S×S is the social accessibility relation denoted by s∼i→ j s
′ iff
1) li(s) = li(s
′),
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The intuition behind ∼i→ j from global state s to global state s
′ is that there is a
shared variable x, which represents a communication channel, between agent i and agent
j such that agent i sends the information (message) in s, and in s′ agent j receives the
information. After receiving the information, all the shared variables between i and j will
have the same values [7, 36]. Figure 2.1 from [7] illustrates∼i→ j using shared and unshared
variables. In this figure, agent i has the set of variables Vari = {x1,x2} and agent j has the
set Var j = {x1,x3} where x1 is the shared variable between i and j and x2 and x3 are the
unshared variables. After receiving the message, the value of the shared variable x1 for
agent j and agent i in state s′ is the same. However, the values of the unshared variables x2
and x3 in states s and s
′ are not changed.
x1 x2
vari [ 1 5 ]
varj [ 1 6 ] 
x1 x3
x1 x2
vari [ 1 5 ]









Figure 2.1: An example of social accessibility relation ∼i→ j [7].
The social accessibility relation ∼i→ j is serial, transitive and Euclidean [7, 36].
The syntax of CTLC, which extends CTL [41] with two modalities for commitment
and fulfillment, is defined as follows [7]:
Definition 2.5 (Syntax of CTLC).
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ϕ | EXϕ | E(ϕUϕ) | EGϕ |Ci→ jϕ | Fu(Ci→ jϕ).
Where:
18
• p,E,X ,G,U,¬ and ∨ are defined as in Definition 2.2;
• The modal connectiveCi→ j stands for “commitment from i to j”; and
• The modal connective Fu(Ci→ j) stands for “fulfillment of commitment”.
In this logic, Ci→ jϕ is read as “agent i commits towards agent j to bring about ϕ”.
Fu(Ci→ jϕ) is read as “the commitmentCi→ jϕ is fulfilled”.
As the main fragment of both CTLK and CTLC logics is the CTL logic, hereafter, we only
recall the semantics of the commitment and fulfillment modalities [7].
• (MC ,s) |=Ci→ jϕ iff ∀ s
′ ∈ S such that s∼i→ j s
′ (MC ,s
′) |= ϕ;
• (MC ,s) |= Fu(Ci→ jϕ) iff ∃ s
′ ∈ S such that s′ ∼i→ j s and (MC ,s
′) |=Ci→ jϕ .
In this semantics, the formulaCi→ jϕ is satisfied in the model MC at global state s iff
the content of the commitment ϕ is satisfied in all global states s′ accessible from s using
∼i→ j. The formula Fu(Ci→ jϕ) is satisfied in the model MC at s if the commitment is
satisfied at any state s′ where s is accessible from s′ using ∼i→ j.
It is worth noticing that both logics CTLK and CTLC have grounded semantics,
which means they can be associated to computational models [99].
2.5 Correspondence Theory
Correspondence theory for modal logic was introduced by van Benthem [92]. It exhibits a
formal analysis of the relationship (correspondence) between classes of frames and modal
languages [55]. One of the most key aspects of possible worlds (Kripke) semantics and
modal logic is highlighted by the fact that modal axioms are kind of representations for the
properties of the accessibility relations [15]. For example, a typical “modal completeness
theorem” read as follows:
19
“A formula is provable in S4 iff it is true in all models based on frames whose ac-
cessibility relation is transitive and reflexive” [15]. This means that, the theorems of S4
(i.e., the axioms K, T and 4 are traditionally been called S4 [43]) must hold in all models
with a transitive and reflexive relations [15]. To analyze the relationship between classes of
frames and modal languages, we have to answer the following semantics questions: “what
can modal formulas say about the frames, and how do they say it ?”[15].
To answer these questions, let us first define frame, model, frame validity, frame
property, frame definability (correspondence), and then show how to use frame definability
in capturing the correspondence between a given modal formula and a class of frames.
Definition 2.6 (Frame). A tuple (W,R1, ...,Rn) withW is a nonempty set of states (worlds)
and for each i (1<= i<= n), Ri is a binary (accessibility) relation onW is called a frame.
Definition 2.7 (Model). Given a frame F = (W,R1, ...,Rn), we say the model M is based
on the frame F = (W,R1, ...,Rn) if M = (W,R1, ...,Rn,V ) for some valuation function V ,
where V is defined as follows: V :W ×Φp → {T,F} over the set of atomic propositions
Φp.
Definition 2.8 (Frame Validity). Given a frame F = (W,R1, ...,Rn), we say that a modal
formula ϕ is valid on F , denoted by F |= ϕ , if M |= ϕ for all models M based on F . A
modal formula ϕ is valid on a class of frames F if it is valid on each frame F in F [15].
Remark 2.1. “Note that if F |= ϕ where ϕ is some modal formula, then F |= ϕ∗ where
ϕ∗ is any substitution instance of ϕ . That is, ϕ∗ is obtained by replacing sentence letters
in ϕ with modal formulas. In particular, this means, for example, in order to show that
F 2ϕ → ϕ , it is enough to show that F 2p→ p where p is a sentence letter” [74].
Definition 2.9 (Frame Property). Suppose that Pr is a property of an accessability relation
(e.g., symmetry or seriality). We say a frame F = (W,R1, ...,Rn) has property Pr w.r.t. a
particular Ri (1<= i<= n) provided Ri has property Pr.
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Thus, we introduce the following frames:
• F = (W,R1, ...,Rn) is called a serial frame w.r.t. a particular Ri (1 <= i <= n)
provided Ri is serial, i.e., for all w ∈W there exists v ∈W , such that wRiv.
• F = (W,R1, ...,Rn) is called a reflexive frame w.r.t. a particular Ri (1 <= i <= n)
provided Ri is reflexive, i.e., for all w ∈W , wRiw.
• F = (W,R1, ...,Rn) is called a transitive frame w.r.t. a particular Ri (1 <= i <= n)
provided Ri is transitive, i.e., for all w,x,v ∈W , if wRix and xRiv then wRiv.
• F = (W,R1, ...,Rn) is called an Euclidean frame w.r.t. a particular Ri (1<= i<= n)
provided Ri is Euclidean, i.e., for all w,x,v ∈W , if wRiv and wRix then vRix.
• F = (W,R1, ...,Rn) is called a symmetric frame w.r.t. a particular Ri (1<= i<= n)
provided Ri is symmetric, i.e., for all w,v ∈W , if wRiv then vRiw.
We also introduce a new particular frame
• F = (W,R1,R2) is called epistemic social frame (ES) provided R1, R2 are the epis-
temic and social accessibility relations such that for all w,v,x ∈W if wR1v and vR2x
then wR2x.
Definition 2.10 (Frame Correspondence). “A modal formula ϕ defines a class of frames F
iff it is valid on precisely the frames in F. That is, not only must ϕ be valid on every frame
in F, it must also be possible to falsify ϕ on any frame that is not in F ”[15].
Hereafter are some examples, from [74], of what classes of frames can a modal lan-
guage define.
EXAMPLE 1. ϕ → ϕ corresponds to the class of reflexive frames.
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Proof. (⇐) Assume that F = (W,R) is reflexive and let M = (W,R,V ) be any model
based on F . Given w ∈W , we need to prove (M ,w) |=ϕ → ϕ . Suppose that (M ,w) |=
ϕ . Then ∀ v ∈W , if wRv then (M ,v) |= ϕ . Since R is reflexive, we have wRw. Thus,
(M ,w) |= ϕ . Consequently, (M ,w) |=ϕ → ϕ .
(⇒) We argue by contraposition. Assume that F is not reflexive. We need to prove
that F 2ϕ → ϕ . Using Remark 2.1, it is enough to show F 2p→ p for any sentence
letter p. As F is not reflexive, ∃ w ∈W s.t. it is not the case that wRw. Consider the model
M =(W,R,V ) based onF with V (v, p)= T ∀ v∈W s.t. v 6=w. Then (M ,w) |=p since,
by assumption, ∀ v ∈W if wRv, then v 6= w and so V (v, p) = T . Further, notice that by the
definition of V ,(M ,w) 2 p. Consequently, (M ,w) |=p∧¬p, and so, F 2p→ p.
EXAMPLE 2. ϕ →ϕ corresponds to the class of transitive frames.
Proof. (⇐) Assume that F = (W,R) is transitive and let M = (W,R,V ) be a model based
on F . Given w ∈W , we need to prove that (M ,w) |= ϕ → ϕ . Let us assume that
(M ,w) |=ϕ . We have to show (M ,w) |=ϕ . Suppose that v ∈W and wRv. We need
to prove that (M ,v) |= ϕ . Let x ∈W be any state with vRx. Since R is transitive and
wRv and vRx, then wRx. Since (M ,w) |= ϕ , we have (M ,x) |= ϕ . Therefore, since x is
an arbitrary state accessible from v, (M ,v) |=ϕ , Hence (M ,w) |=ϕ . Consequently,
(M ,w) |=ϕ →ϕ .
(⇒) We argue by contraposition. Assume that F is not transitive. We need to prove
that F 2 ϕ → ϕ . Based on Remark 2.1, it is enough to show F 2 p→ p for
any sentence letter p. Since F is not transitive, there are states w,v,x ∈W with wRv and
vRx but it is not the case that wRx. Consider the model M = (W,R,V ) based on F with
V (y, p)= T ∀ y∈W s.t. y 6= x. Since (M ,x)2 p andwRv and vRx, we have (M ,w)2p.
Furthermore, (M ,w) |=p since the only state where p is false is x and it is assumed that













Figure 2.2: A typical model checker
2.6 Model Checking
Model checking is a formal verification approach that automatically verifies whether a given
system model satisfies system specification or not [24]. Technically, the problem of model
checking can be summarized as follows: given a modelM that represents a real system and
a formula ϕ that represents a system specification (property) in certain temporal logic, does
this model satisfy that specification or not? If the model does not satisfy the specification
(i.e., M 2 ϕ), then the process returns a “counterexample” showing the steps where the
error was encountered. Otherwise, it will return “true” which means the model satisfies the
specification (i.e.,M  ϕ). Figure 2.2 depicts a typical model checking procedure.
Model checking algorithms can be implemented explicitly using Kripke structures.
This type of algorithms is normally known as automata-based algorithms (e.g., [27, 47]).
The other type of algorithms is developed implicitly using Boolean functions [17] and it is
known as symbolic-based algorithms [17, 69, 33].
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Generally speaking, model checking approaches suffer from the “state explosion
problem” [25]. Symbolic approaches are considered efficient verification approaches since
they “alleviate” the problem [63, 78]. In particular, their verification algorithms are imple-
mented using Boolean functions (Bfs), which are represented by Ordered Binary Decision
Diagrams OBDDs [16], rather than explicit Kripke structures. Therefore, symbolic-based
algorithms consume less memory than automata-based algorithms [25]. In this research, to
verify our proposed logic, we develop both algorithms and compare their results.
2.7 Related Work
In this thesis, we classify the work related to this research into three different categories.
First, research work directed towards modeling and verifying knowledge only. Second,
research work directed towards modeling and verifying commitments only. Third, research
work directed towards both knowledge and commitments.
2.7.1 Knowledge in MASs
Penczek and Lomuscio [76] introduced Computation Tree Logic of Knowledge (CTLK)
which extends CTL [41] with modalities to reason about knowledge and time. In this work,
the authors adopt interpreted systems as modeling formalism. In particular, knowledge
modalities are interpreted using epistemic accessibility relations. After that, Lomuscio et al.
[61] addressed the problem of model checking CTLK by transforming it into the problem
of model checking ARCTL. Concretely, they transformed the CTLK model into ARCTL
model and CTLK formulas into ARCTL formulas. Later, they developed an OBDD-based
symbolic model checker MCMAS [63] and used it to verify agents’ epistemic properties in
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MASs. Hereafter, they computed the complexity of model checking CTLK [64]. Neverthe-
less, the authors did not analyze the interaction between CTLK and social commitments.
Furthermore, they did not address the soundness and completeness of CTLK.
Raimondi and Lomuscio [79] developed an OBDD-based procedure to verify deontic
interpreted systems [65]. After that, Wozna et al. [102], introduced a bounded model
checking algorithm for verifying deontic interpreted systems. In particular, the authors
presented a new logical language, CTLKD, which extends CTL with modalities to reason
about temporal evolution of epistemic state and their correct and incorrect behavior. In this
work, local states are classified into correct and incorrect states. Furthermore, a modality
Oiϕ for representing the correct states of every agent is also developed. Finally, Lomuscio
et al. [66] extended this approach to include explicit knowledge. However, no interaction
with commitments has been investigated. Moreover, the soundness and completeness of the
proposed approaches are not considered.
Meyden et al. [93] put forward a language that captures knowledge and time in
systems with perfect recall. Using the proposed language which is based on linear time
logic, systems remember all their past states. In this work, interpreted systems were adopted
as modeling tools. Moreover, the authors used the MCK model checker [46] to verify their
proposed logic. Nevertheless, they did not address the interaction between their language
and commitments.
Wan et al. [97] developed a new logic to reason about probabilistic knowledge called
Probabilistic Computation Tree Logic of Knowledge (PCTLK). In this work, MASs are
modeled using probabilistic interpreted systems. After that, the problem of model check-
ing PCTLK is tackled by transforming it into the problem of model checking Probabilistic
Computation Tree Logic (PCTL) [53]. Hereafter, the authors implemented their approach
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on top of the PRISM model checker [59]. However, the interaction of PCTLK with com-
mitments is not addressed. Furthermore, the soundness and completeness of PCTLK is not
proven.
2.7.2 Social Commitments in MASs
Bentahar et al. [11] introduced a logic to reason about social commitments and argumen-
tations. In particular, they developed a modal logic called DCTL∗CAN built over CTL
∗
[24] and dynamic logic. The main objective of this work is to show how commitments are
changed during conversations. After that, the authors developed several reasoning postu-
lates to specify commitments and argumentations. However, they did not prove the sound-
ness and completeness of DCTL∗CAN . Moreover, they did not study the interaction be-
tween their proposed logic and knowledge. Later, in [9], Bentahar et al. proposed a model
checking approach to verify communicative MASs. In this work, agents are linked with
knowledge and beliefs and interact with each other according to a set of logical rules. The
authors put forward a tableau-based algorithm for model checking their logic and proved
the soundness and completeness of their verification procedure, but not of the logic itself.
Moreover, they did not investigate the interaction between commitments and knowledge
from the semantics perspective.
Singh [88] proposed a temporal logic to reason about practical and dialectical con-
ditional commitments. In this proposal, the author developed a set of reasoning postulates
and set of semantics constraints. Thereafter, Singh used Benthem’s correspondence theory
for modal logic to prove the soundness and completeness of the proposed logic. However,
instead of corresponding the reasoning postulates to classes of frames, Singh corresponded
the reasoning postulates to a set of semantics constraints. Moreover, no interaction between
the proposed logic and knowledge is provided.
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In [7], Bentahar et al. developed a new temporal logic called CTLC, an extension of
CTL with modalities to reason about commitments and their fulfillment. In this work, the
authors extended the formalism of interpreted systems by associating a set of variables for
each agent. By so doing, the authors modeled the communication between the interacting
agents. Following that, they developed a symbolic model checking algorithm to verify
CTLC. Thereafter, they computed the complexity of CTLC model checking procedure.
Later, El-Menshawy et al. [36] refined the semantics of CTLC and introduced CTLC+,
a temporal logic of commitments and their fulfillment. To verify this logic, the problem
of model checking CTLC+ is transformed into the problem of model checking ARCTL
and GCTL∗ in order to benefit from the extended NuSMV and CWB-NC model checkers
respectively. However, they neither investigated the soundness and completeness of their
logics, nor analyzed the interaction between their logics and knowledge.
Chesani et al. [20] introduced a commitment logic that allows the domain modeler to
determine the roles of the debtor and creditor in handling social commitments. Furthermore,
the authors proposed a set of axioms for commitment operations. However, they did not
pursue the soundness and completeness of the proposed logic. Moreover, they did not
address the interaction between the proposed logic and knowledge.
El Kholy et al. [32] put forward a new temporal logic, CTLcc, which extends CTL
[41] with modalities to specify conditional commitments and their fulfillments. In this
work, the authors adopt the formalism of interpreted systems as a modeling tool. Further-
more, they developed a set of rules to reason about conditional commitments and their
fulfillments. After that, they addressed the model checking problem of CTLcc by devel-
oping a symbolic model checking algorithm and analyzed the complexity of the proposed
algorithm. Hereafter, they implemented the developed algorithm on top of MCMAS. Nev-
ertheless, they did not investigate the soundness and completeness of CTLcc. Further, they
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did not study the interaction between the proposed logic and knowledge.
2.7.3 Interaction between Knowledge and Commitments
Schmidt et al. [81] introduced a new temporal logic called Agent Dynamic Logic (ADL)
to study the interaction between knowledge, actions and commitments. In this work, the
authors integrated a different type of commitments called “internal commitments”. An in-
ternal commitment is referred by Castelfranchi [18] as “ a relation between an agent and
action” not between two or more agents as in the case with social commitments. Moreover,
the authors introduced some axioms that exhibit agents’ knowledge about its commitments.
However, they proved that their proposed logic is sound and complete with respect to a
Kripke-style semantics rather than using correspondence theory. Moreover, internal com-
mitment suffered from the semantics verification problem similar to the mental approaches.
Woz´na [101] proposed CDCTL∗K, a new temporal logic that extends CTL∗ [24] with
modalities to reason about knowledge, correct functioning behaviour, and social commit-
ments in MASs. In this work, Communication Deontic Interpreted Systems (CDIS) was
adopted to define the semantics of the proposed logic. Furthermore, a Sat-based bounded
model checking algorithm was developed to verify the CDCTL∗K logic. However, nei-
ther the interaction between knowledge and commitment in MASs nor the soundness and
completeness of the proposed logic are addressed. In addition to this, the author did not
investigate the complexity analysis of the proposed logic.
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2.8 Summary
In this chapter, we presented the preliminaries needed to go throughout the thesis. More-
over, we reviewed the research work related to our work highlighting the differences be-
tween them. In the next chapter, we will introduce a new formal and consistent approach to
capture the interaction between knowledge and social commitments in MASs.
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Chapter 3
Interaction between Knowledge and
Social Commitments in MASs
In this chapter1, we present a comprehensive and systematic technique to formally reason
about knowledge, communicative social commitments and their interactions in MASs. In
particular, we develop a new consistent temporal logic called the logic of knowledge and
commitments (CTLKC+). CTLKC+ extends CTL [41] with modalities to reason about
knowledge, commitments and their fulfillments. This logic captures the interaction between
knowledge and communicative social commitments from the semantics perspective. To
model MASs using CTLKC+, we develop a new version of interpreted systems based on a
new social accessibility relation [2].
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we aim to figure out the relationship between knowledge and social com-
mitments from the semantics perspective. To do so, we combined two established logics,
1The results of this chapter are published in [2].
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CTLK [76] (an extension of CTL logic [41] with a modality for reasoning about knowledge)
and CTLC [7] (an extension of CTL logic with modalities for reasoning about commitments
and their fulfillments) in one logic that we call CTLKC. This combination is designed so
that it keeps the same semantics of the knowledge and commitment modalities as they are in
the original logics. This combination allows us to express formulas merging the two modal-
ities and check if some basic and principle intuitions are satisfied in the resulting logic. Such
intuitions about the interaction between knowledge and commitments are represented as a
set of reasoning postulates yielding some paradoxes. The purpose of identifying such para-
doxes is to motivate the need for a new way of making commitments and knowledge interact
in a consistent logic. Thus, we propose a new logic called CTLKC+ that fixes the identified
paradoxes and allows us to reason about knowledge and commitments in a consistent way.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we introduce
the model, syntax and semantics of the CTLKC logic. In Section 3.3, we present a set of
reasoning postulates written in CTLKC logic to capture the relationship between knowl-
edge and social commitments. We use the NetBill payment protocol [90] as a running
example to illustrate our reasoning postulates. In Section 3.4, we present some conclusive
remarks about CTLKC. In Section 3.5, we introduce the new consistent logic CTLKC+ that
overcomes all the problems raised in CTLKC. Finally, we conclude the chapter in Section
3.6.
3.2 CTLKC Logic
In this section, we develop a unified model for both CTLK [76] and CTLC [7] defined
over the formalism of the extended version of interpreted systems [7]. This model will be
used later on to define the semantics of the CTLKC logic. Before that, we present how to
construct a multi-modal logic using independent join [45].
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3.2.1 Combining Logics
There are many ways to construct a multi-modal logic by combining logics ( see for exam-
ple [6, 45]). To construct our multi-modal logic, the CTLKC logic, we use the independent
join “fusion” [45] for combining the two logics CTLK and CTLC. Typically, the indepen-
dent join of two logics is denoted by A1⊗A2. Given two logics A1 and A2, their languages
L1 and L2, and their axiomatic systems X1 and X2, the logic A1⊗A2 is the “smallest”
logic with the following properties [78]:
• The language LA1⊗A2 = LA1 ∪LA2 .
• The logic A1⊗A2 has the set of axioms in both logics.
If the logics A1 and A2 are interpreted using Kripke frames Fr1 = (S,R
1
1, . . . ,R
1
n)
and Fr2 = (S,R
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y/y∈[1,m] are accessibility relations, then
the semantics for the combined logic A1⊗ A2 can be defined in the Kripke frame F =




1, . . . ,R
2
m) which results from applying the independent join on the frames
Fr1 and Fr2 .
The reason behind selecting the independent join to construct our combined logic is
the fact that it “keeps the same semantics and axioms” of the combined logics [45]. Con-
sequently, we can analyze the relationship between knowledge and commitments exactly
as they are advocated in the two independent logics CTLK and CTLC. Precisely, in this
chapter, we introduce a set of reasoning postulates to figure out the relationship between
knowledge and social commitment in MASs from the semantics perspective. The new logic
can express such postulates since both modalities can be expressed. By so doing, we answer
the first and second research questions (i.e., [Q1] and [Q2]).
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3.2.2 CTLKC Model
Definition 3.1 (CTLKC Model). A model M = (S, I,Rt ,{≈i |i ∈A },
{∼i→ j |(i, j) ∈A
2},V ) which is a member of the set of all models M is a tuple,
where:
• S, I,Rt ,V ,≈i and ∼i→ j are the same as in Definitions 2.1 and 2.4.
In this model, we assume that each accessible state is reachable. The syntax of
CTLKC , in BNF format, is defined as follows:
Definition 3.2 (Syntax of CTLKC).
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ϕ | EXϕ | E(ϕUϕ) | EGϕ | Kiϕ |Ci→ jϕ | Fu(Ci→ jϕ).
CTLKC is at least as expressive as CTLK and CTLC. CTLK, CTLC and CTLKC
can all express CTL properties since they are all built over the CTL logic. However, CTLK
logic can express the CTL properties in addition to knowledge modality (i.e., Kip). On
the other hand, CTLC can express commitment modality and its fulfillment (i.e., Ci→ jp
and Fu(Ci→ jp)) which cannot be expressed in CTLK. By introducing the CTLKC com-
bined logic, we can express properties on both knowledge and social commitment (e.g.,
Ki(Ci→ jp)).
3.3 Knowledge and Commitments Analysis
3.3.1 Running Example
To capture the relationship between knowledge and social commitments in MASs from the
semantics perspective, we identify some reasoning postulates and study their validity in the
combined CTLKC logic. Before that, we present the NetBill payment protocol [90], from
the business domain, as a running example to illustrate the reasoning postulates.
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The NetBill payment protocol (see Figure 3.1 from [38]) is developed for buying and
selling encrypted software goods on the Internet [28, 90]. This protocol consists of eight
steps [90]. First, the customer requests a quote from the merchant. The merchant sends
the quote to the customer (i.e., Present Quote) . If the customer accepts the quote, then the
merchant sends the software (deliver the goods) encrypted and keeps the key. The customer
creates an electronic payment order (EPO) including a description for the received goods
and send it to the merchant. The merchant verifies the EPO and sends it to the NetBill
server. The NetBill server checks the customer bank account and deposits the payment on
the merchant account. Then, a receipt including the key to decrypt the goods is sent to















6: Send EPO 
and Key 
Figure 3.1: The NetBill protocol [38]
In the rest of this thesis, we consider the following commitments to represent the
interactions between the customer (Cus) and the merchant (Mer) agents in the NetBill
protocol:
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1. CCus→Mer sendPayment, which means that the customer (Cus) commits toward the
merchant (Mer) to send the agreed amount of payment (sendPayment) (sendPayment
is an atomic proposition that represents the content of the commitment).
2. CMer→Cus deliverGoods, which means that the merchant (Mer) commits toward the
customer (Cus) to deliver the required goods (deliverGoods) (deliverGoods is an
atomic proposition that represents the content of the commitment).
3. CMer→Cus sendReciept, which means that the merchant (Mer) commits toward the
customer (Cus) to send the receipt (sendReciept) (sendReciept is an atomic proposi-
tion that represents the content of the commitment).
3.3.2 Selection Criteria
To identify reasoning postulates that capture the interaction between knowledge and com-
mitments in MASs simultaneously, there should be clear criteria for selecting such pos-
tulates. Since this kind of reasoning has not been investigated yet (i.e., reasoning about
knowledge and social commitments in MASs in the same logic), we propose the following
criteria based on common intuitions:
• It should not be the case that an agent commits about everything it knows to others.
• It should not be the case that an agent should commit about everything known by
others.
• An agent should know about its own commitment.
• An agent should know the content of its fulfilled commitment.
• An agent should know the content of any fulfilled commitment directed towards it.
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• An agent should know about the fulfillment of its commitment.
• An agent should know about the fulfillment of any commitment directed towards it.
• A sincere agent should know (i.e., believe) the content of its own commitment.
• A sincere agent should fulfill its commitment.
• A liar agent could not know (i.e., believe) the content of its commitment.
• If an agent knows about its own commitment, then this commitment should exist,
which means an agent should not know about a non-existing commitment.
3.3.3 Desiderata of Paradoxes
In this section, we identify some paradoxes that result from combining CTLK and CTLC
into the new CTLKC logic. Those paradoxes are represented as postulates that are 1) not
reasonable in open MAS, but valid in CTLKC; or 2) desirable for the interaction between
knowledge and commitments, but can get violated in CTLKC because they are not valid.
For each paradox, a validity proof or a counter-example is provided. In the rest of this
chapter, all the postulates are AGϕ formulas, which means they are considered globally
(i.e., in all states) in all paths. However, to simplify the notation, AG is omitted. For
instance, instead of AG(Kiϕ →Ci→ jϕ), we simply write Kiϕ →Ci→ jϕ .
P1. [Committing everything known to others]
Kiϕ →Ci→ jϕ, for all j ∈ A where i 6= j.
Meaning: An agent (the debtor) commits toward all other agents (the creditors)
about what it knows.
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Proof. Assume that (M ,s) |= Kiϕ . From the semantics of Kiϕ , for all states s
′ ∈ S
such that s≈i s
′, we have (M ,s′) |= ϕ . Now, suppose there is a state s′ ∈ S such that
s∼i→ j s
′ and (M ,s′) |= ¬ϕ . With respect to the semantics of a commitment modal-
ity, the state s will not be labeled with the commitment (i.e., (M ,s) |= ¬Ci→ jϕ).
Furthermore, from condition 1 of the definition of the social accessibility relation
s ∼i→ j s
′ (i.e., li(s) = li(s
′)), we conclude that the state s′ is epistemically acces-
sible from s (i.e., s ≈i s
′) and since the current state (i.e., s) holds the knowledge
modality (i.e., (M ,s) |= Kiϕ), we have (M ,s
′) |= ϕ , which is contradiction. Thus,
(M ,s) |=Ci→ jϕ , so we are done.
Discussion: The idea of this postulate is to study the effect of agent’s knowledge
on its commitments. It simply says whenever an agent knows something, it should
commit its knowledge to all other agents in the system. In terms of agent communi-
cation, this would mean an agent tells other agents whatever it knows. The validity of
this postulate is based on the fact that by establishing communication channels, the
epistemic relation is also established. The postulate is not reasonable in open MASs
where agents are selfish. The following is an example illustrating the paradox.
Example 3.1. From the NetBill payment protocol, assume that the merchant knows
the goods that it will deliver. By applying the postulate, KMer deliverGoods →
CMer→Cus deliverGoods, the merchant will commit towards all the customers to de-
liver them the goods, which they might not have requested, but it happens that they—
for example— established communication channels with that merchant and rejected
the price quote for some reasons.
P2. [Committing everything known by others]
KiK jϕ →Ci→ jϕ where i 6= j.
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Meaning: An agent (the debtor) commits toward another agent (the creditor) to bring
about what it (i.e., the debtor) knows about the creditor’s knowledge.
Proof. Assume (M ,s) |= KiK jϕ . From the semantics of KiK jϕ , for all states s
′ ∈ S
such that s≈i s
′, we have (M ,s′) |= K jϕ . Suppose that there exists a global state s
′ ∈
S such that s∼i→ j s
′ and (M ,s′) |= ¬ϕ . According to the semantics of commitment
modality, the current state (i.e., s) will not be labeled with the commitment (i.e.,
(M ,s) |= ¬Ci→ jϕ). Since≈ j is reflexive, we conclude that (M ,s
′) |= ¬K jϕ . On the
other hand, since an accessible state via∼i→ j is also accessible via≈i, it follows that
(M ,s′) |= K jϕ , so the contradiction. Consequently, (M ,s) |=Ci→ jϕ .
Discussion: In this postulate, the purpose is to study the effect of an agent’s knowl-
edge about another agent’s knowledge on the commitment of the first agent towards
the second. The formula says that an agent should commit towards another agent
about what the first agent knows about the knowledge of the second. In other words,
whenever an agent knows that the other agent knows something, it will commit to
bring about this information towards that agent. In terms of agent communication,
this formula would mean that an agent should tell the other agent what it knows the
other knows. The following example shows that this postulate is not reasonable in
MASs.
Example 3.2. Let us assume that the customer knows that the merchant will deliver
the goods. Applying this postulate, KCusKMer deliverGoods→CCus→Mer deliverGoods,
the customer will commit towards the merchant to deliver the goods which contra-
dicts what actually has to be done (i.e., the merchant is responsible of delivering the
goods to the customer).
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P3. [Committing everything known from others]
KiK jϕ →C j→iϕ where i 6= j.
Meaning: An agent (the debtor) commits toward another agent (the creditor) to bring
about what the creditor knows about the debtor’s knowledge.
Proof. Assume (M ,s) |=KiK jϕ . From the semantics of Kiϕ , for all states s
′ ∈ S such
that s ≈i s
′, we have (M ,s′) |= K jϕ . Because ≈i is reflexive, then (M ,s) |= K jϕ .
Suppose there exists a global state s′ ∈ S such that s ∼ j→i s
′ and (M ,s′) |= ¬ϕ .
According to the semantics of commitment modality, the current state (i.e., s) will not
be labeled with the commitment (i.e., (M ,s) |= ¬Ci→ jϕ). On the other hand, since
an accessible state via ∼ j→i is also accessible via ≈ j, it follows that (M ,s
′) |= ϕ , so
the contradiction. Consequently, (M ,s) |=C j→iϕ .
Example 3.3. To clarify the paradox, let us consider the following example. As-
sume that the customer knows that the merchant will deliver the goods. By applying
this postulate, KCusKMer deliverGoods→CMer→Cus deliverGoods, the merchant will
commit towards the customer to deliver the goods. Thus, only a customer’s knowl-
edge influences and even obliges the merchant’s commitment, which is counter-
intuitive. In fact, the customer could be uncertain about its knowledge, even though
the commitment should be established. This postulate can result in serious circum-
stances if the customer agent is malicious, so it can express wrong knowledge about
the merchant, obliging that merchant to establish unwanted commitment, such as
knowing that the delivery is free of charge.
P4. [Knowing about its own commitment]
Ci→ jϕ → Ki(Ci→ jϕ) where i 6= j.
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Meaning: An agent knows about its commitment.
This postulate is a reasonable one as agents should be aware of their own and in-
tentional commitments, but it results in a paradox as the formula is not valid. The
following model depicted in Figure 3.2 shows a counterexample.
Model 1
In this model, assume that the global state s0 is labeled by the commitment (i.e.,
(M ,s0) |= (Ci→ jϕ)) and there exists a global state s1 accessible from s0 using so-
cial accessibility relation (i.e., s0 ∼i→ j s1). From the semantics of social commit-
ments, s1 is labeled by ϕ (i.e., (M ,s1) |= ϕ) and since the commitments modality is
shift reflexive, then s1 will be labeled by the commitment (i.e., (M ,s1) |= (Ci→ jϕ)).
Moreover, suppose there exists a global state s2 accessible from s0 using epistemic
accessibility relation (i.e., s0 ≈i s2). Let us assume that there exists two global states
s3 and s4 accessible from s2 using social accessibility relation (i.e., s2 ∼i→ j s3 and
s2 ∼i→ j s4). Suppose that s3 is labeled by ϕ (i.e., (M ,s3) |= ϕ) and s4 is labeled
by ¬ϕ (i.e., (M ,s4) |= ¬ϕ). From the semantics of social commitments, s2 will
not be labeled by the commitments (i.e.,(M ,s2) |= ¬(Ci→ jϕ)). Thus, from the se-
mantics of knowledge, s0 will not be labeled by the knowledge of commitment (i.e.,
(M ,s0) |= ¬Ki(Ci→ jϕ)).
Discussion: The reason why this postulate is not valid is due to the fact that a state
accessible through the epistemic accessibility relation≈i is not necessarily accessible
though the social accessibility ∼i→ j. Consequently, we can find a state accessible
through≈i that does not satisfy the commitment, although this case cannot happen in
a state accessible via ∼i→ j. Let us consider the following example.
Example 3.4. Assuming the customer commits toward the merchant to send the
agreed amount of payment. Applying this postulate, CCus→Mer sendPayment → KCus
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Figure 3.2: Model 1
(CCus→Mer sendPayment), it is obvious that the customer should know about this
commitment and about the amount to be sent. Otherwise, this would mean that the
commitment is made accidently, without the agent being conscious.
P5. [Knowing the content of its own fulfilled commitment]
Fu(Ci→ jϕ)→ Kiϕ where i 6= j.
Meaning: An agent knows the content of its fulfilled commitment.
This postulate is a reasonable one, but as for the previous postulate, it results in
another paradox as it is not valid. The following model depicted in Figure 3.3 shows
a counterexample.
Model 2
In this model, assume that (M ,s) |= Fu(Ci→ jϕ). From the semantics of fulfillment,
there exists a global state s′ ∈ S such that s′ ∼i→ j s and (M ,s
′) |=Ci→ jϕ . Suppose
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(M ,s′) |= ¬ϕ . From the first condition of the definition of the social accessibility
relation s′ ∼i→ j s (i.e., li(s
′) = li(s)), we conclude that the state s
′ is epistemically
accessible from s (i.e, s ≈i s
′). Since the global state s′ is not labeled by ϕ (i.e.,
(M ,s′) |= ¬ϕ), then, (M ,s) |= ¬Kiϕ . So, the result.
C ij
Fu( C ij )
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Figure 3.3: Model 2
Discussion: This postulate intuitively reflects the fact that an agent knows the ful-
fillment of its commitment. The main reason behind its non-validity is the non-
reflexiveness of the social accessibility relation. This allows the commitment state
not to satisfy the commitment content. Thus, the result follows from the fact that
this commitment state is epistemically accessible from the fulfillment state. It is ex-
tremely important for this postulate to be valid. The following example clarifies the
case.
Example 3.5. Assume that the customer sends the agreed amount of payment to the
merchant (i.e., fulfills its commitment of sending the amount). Applying the postu-
late, Fu(CCus→MersendPayment)→ KCus sendPayment, and because the formula is
not valid, it could happen that the agent does not know (or may be forgot) about the
sending action. Hence, the agent can send the amount again and again.
P6. [Knowing the content of the other’s fulfilled commitment]
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Fu(Ci→ jϕ)→ K jϕ where i 6= j.
Meaning: The creditor knows the content of the debtor’s fulfilled commitment.
This postulate should be satisfied in all the models (i.e., valid), as the creditor should
be aware of the satisfaction of the commitment directed to it once this fulfillment
happens. Otherwise, the creditor can ask the debtor to satisfy the commitment again.
The following model depicted in Figure 3.4 shows a counterexample.
Model 3
In this model, assume that (M ,s1) |= Fu(Ci→ jϕ). From the semantics of fulfillment,
there exists a global state s0 ∈ S such that s0 ∼i→ j s1 and (M ,s0) |=Ci→ jϕ . Assume
the existence of another global state s2 accessible from s1 via ≈ j and holding ¬ϕ
(i.e., (M ,s2) |= ¬ϕ). From the semantics of the knowledge operator, it follows that
¬K jϕ holds in S1, so we are done.
C ij Fu( C ij )
Kj 





Figure 3.4: Model 3
Discussion: The reason why this postulate is not valid, so it can be violated is because
the social accessibility relation ∼i→ j is independent from the epistemic relation for
the creditor ≈ j. Thus, it is always possible to connect an undistinguishable state for
the creditor that does not satisfy the commitment content to the fulfillment state. The
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following example shows the consequences of the underlying paradox.
Example 3.6. Assume that the customer sends the agreed amount of payment to the
merchant (i.e., fulfills its commitment). If the postulate is valid, we should have:
Fu(Ccust→Mer sendPayment)→ KMersendPayment. Thus, the merchant should know
that the payment has been sent, because fulfilling the commitment means a proof of
payment has been issued. Since the formula is not valid, we could simply imagine a
case where the merchant claims that no payment has been sent, so it will require that
a new payment should be issued, and the situation can be repeated infinitely often.
P7. [Knowing the fulfillment of its own commitment]
Fu(Ci→ jϕ)→ KiFu(Ci→ jϕ) where i 6= j.
Meaning: The agent knows that it fulfills its commitment.
This postulate is similar to P4, except that P4 is about knowing the commitment not
its fulfillment. However, both of them should be valid as the agent should be aware
of both its commitment and fulfillment actions.
Model 4
It is easy to find a model violating this formula. We only need to link a state s2 to
a state s1 using ≈i (i.e., s1 ≈i s2) such that s1 |= Fu(Ci→ jϕ) and s2 |= ¬Fu(Ci→ jϕ).
Consequently, s2 |=¬KiFu(Ci→ jϕ). State s2 should not be accessible from s1 through
the social accessibility relation∼i→ j. This allows s2 not to be labeled by Fu(Ci→ jϕ).
The reason is because if s2 is also accessible from s1 using∼i→ j, and knowing that s1
is socially accessible from the commitment state s0, then s2 is also socially accessible
from s0 since ∼i→ j is transitive. In that case, we will have s2 |= Fu(Ci→ jϕ).
Discussion: As shown in Model 4, the satisfiability of the negation of P7 is guar-
anteed since a state accessible through the epistemic accessibility relation ≈i is not
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necessarily accessible through the social accessibility relation from i to j (i.e.,∼i→ j).
As for P4, this postulate is very significant in open MASs and should be satisfied in
all possible models. This would reflect the agent’s intentionality of its action to ful-
fill its own commitment. Having a model violating this postulate (such as Model 4)
would mean that the agent is not aware about its own action of fulfilling its own com-
mitment. Thus, the agent could fulfill the commitment many times, maybe infinitely
often. The following example illustrates the paradox.
Example 3.7. Let us assume that the customer fulfills its commitment of sending the
payment to the merchant. Being aware of the fulfillment action performed by the
customer is formally expressed as follows:
Fu(CCus→MersendPayment)→ KCusFu(CCus→MersendPayment). Since this formula
is not valid, we could have a model in which the customer fulfills its commitment
but ignores its own fulfillment action. This inconsistency could have devastating
consequences if the agent is honest with itself, so it could send the payment many
times.
P8. [Knowing the fulfillment of the debtor’s commitment]
Fu(Ci→ jϕ)→ K jFu(Ci→ jϕ) where i 6= j.
Meaning: The creditor knows that the debtor fulfills its commitment.
This postulate is about knowing the fulfillment of the commitment by the creditor.
Model 5
A similar model to Model 4 can be used with a small modification. We simply need
to link a state s2 to a state s1 using ≈ j (i.e., s1 ≈ j s2) such that s1 |= Fu(Ci→ jϕ) and
s2 |= ¬Fu(Ci→ jϕ). Thus, s2 |= ¬K jFu(Ci→ jϕ). Like in Model 4, state s2 should not
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be accessible from s1 through the social accessibility relation ∼i→ j in order to have
s2 |= ¬Fu(Ci→ j)ϕ .
Discussion: As illustrated in Model 5, the violation of the postulate is made possible
because from a given state s, the set of states that are accessible via ≈ j and the set of
states that are accessible via∼i→ j could be disjoint. The validity of the postulate is of
a great importance in open MASs. This would reflect that, fulfilling the commitment
is public. The following example illustrates the underlying paradox.
Example 3.8. Let us assume that the customer fulfills its commitment of sending the
payment to the merchant. This fulfillment should be public so that the merchant can
observe it, which means:
Fu(CCus→MersendPayment)→ KMerFu(CCus→MersendPayment). Violating this pos-
tulate would be source of problematic scenarios as the merchant can require the pay-
ment to be resent, probably many times until it achieves a state in which the merchant
can get the information that the payment has been sent.
P9. [Commitment-knowledge modus ponens]
(Ci→ jϕ ∧Ki(ϕ → ψ))→Ci→ jψ where i 6= j.
Meaning: The debtor commits to the conclusion of an implication it knows if it
commits to the premise.
Proof. Let s be a state such that s |= (Ci→ jϕ ∧Ki(ϕ → ψ)). Since any state socially
accessible from s is also epistemically accessible from the same state, all the states
socially accessible from s will satisfy ϕ (using the semantics of Ci→ jϕ) and will
also satisfy ϕ → ψ (using the semantics of Ki(ϕ → ψ)). Using modus ponens, any
accessible state from s via ∼i→ j will satisfy ψ . Thus, the result follows from the
semantics ofCi→ jψ .
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Discussion: We consider this postulate as a paradox as it over-commits the debtor
to the consequences of all the implications it might know. The over-commitment
becomes more apparent if the creditor ignores the implications. Instead of having the
postulate as a valid formula in all the possible models, it is more desirable to be a
satisfiable formula that could be forced in some specific applications where agents
should be sincere.
3.4 Conclusive Remarks about CTLKC
In the previous section, we identified nine paradoxes related to the interaction between
knowledge and social commitments. Four of which (i.e., P1, P2, P3, and P9) are valid
postulates in CTLKC but represent undesirable and unreasonable properties. The remaining
five paradoxes (i.e., P4, P5, P6, P7, and P8) are non-valid formulas in CTLKC that should
be valid in real settings. The former group are paired with their validity proofs, while the
latter ones are followed by counterexamples showing the satisfiability of their negations.
The main reason of having the first fifth paradoxes (P1 to P5) and the paradoxes P7
and P9 in CTLKC is that the set of states that are accessible from a given state s using the
social accessibility relation ∼i→ j is, in general, included in or equal to the set of states that
are accessible from the same state s using the epistemic accessibility relation ≈i. Thus,
each state accessible from s using ∼i→ j is also accessible from the same state using ≈i.
However, it is possible to find a state accessible from s through ≈i without being among
the states accessible from the same state using∼i→ j. This means that in this case, the set of
states that are accessible from a given state s using the social accessibility relation ∼i→ j is
strictly included in the set of states that are accessible from the same state s using the epis-
temic accessibility relation ≈i. Four direct consequences of that are: 1) whenever we have
knowledge (Paradox P1) or knowledge of knowledge (Paradoxes P2 and P3), we should
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have commitment about that knowledge; 2) it is possible to have commitment, without hav-
ing knowledge of it (Paradox P4); 3) it is possible to have fulfillment of a commitment
without having knowledge of its content (Paradox P5) and of the fulfillment of the com-
mitment (Paradox P7); and 4) whenever we have commitment and knowledge about an
implication and its antecedent, we should have commitment about the consequence (Para-
dox P9). In the next section (Section 3.5), we will propose a solution to those paradoxes by
removing this inclusion constraint.
For the remaining paradoxes (P6 and P8), the main reason behind them is that the set
of states accessible from a given state s using the social accessibility relation ∼i→ j from
the debtor i to the creditor j is independent from the epistemic relation ≈ j of the creditor
j. Thus, it is possible to have an accessible state from the fulfillment state using ≈ j that
does not satisfy the commitment content without being accessible from the commitment
state using ∼i→ j. Consequently, we will have fulfillment of a commitment without know-
ing its content by the creditor (Paradox P6). Finally, it is possible to have an accessible
state from the fulfillment state using ≈ j without being accessible from the commitment
state using ∼i→ j. Consequently, we could have fulfillment without the knowledge of the
creditor (Paradox P8). In the next section, we will solve those two paradoxes by linking the
semantics of commitment and its fulfillment to the creditor.
What is particularly interesting to observe is that the two logics, namely CTLK for
knowledge and CTLC for commitments, are consistent and working properly if taken indi-
vidually. This has been proven through many applications and case studies that have been
successfully modeled using these two logics (see for instance [7, 37, 43, 50, 51, 62]). The
paradoxes only arise when the two logics are merged together. Having such paradoxes in
the combined logic (CTLKC) answers the third research question [Q3].
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3.5 CTLKC+ Logic
To fix the identified paradoxes, we introduce CTLKC+, the new logic of knowledge and
commitments. In this section, we first present the model of CTLKC+ and introduce the
syntax and semantics of this logic. Then, we trace each paradox and show its solution.
3.5.1 Model of CTLKC+
Definition 3.3 (Model of CTLKC+). A modelM= (S, I,Rt ,{≈i |i ∈A },
{≈i→ j |(i, j) ∈A
2},V ) which is a member of the set of all modelsM is a tuple, where:
• S, I,Rt ,≈i and V are the same as in Definition 3.1.
• For each pair (i, j) ∈A 2, ≈i→ j⊆ S×S is the social accessibility relation defined by
s≈i→ j s
′ iffVari∩Var j 6= /0 such that ∀x∈Vari∩Var j, we have l
x





The intuition behind the new social accessibility relation ≈i→ j from one global state
s to another global state s′ (s≈i→ j s
′) is that there are some shared variables (i.e., communi-
cation channels) between the interacting agents i and j such that agent i sends the message
(information) through the channel in s, and agent j receives the message in s′. After receiv-
ing the message, all the shared variables between i and j will have the same values (i.e.,




′) ∀x ∈ Vari ∩Var j). Unlike the previous social accessibility relation
∼i→ j, there is no restriction on the content of the unshared variables for both agents, as they
can both receive, at the same time, information from other agents through other channels
involving other variables for each one of them. Those variables can be thus different from s
to s′. This idea is illustrated in Figure 3.5. where two agents i and j have some shared vari-
ables to communicate as follows: Agent i has the set of variablesVari = { x1,x2} and Agent
j has the set of variables Var j = {x1,x
′
2}. The variable x1 is the shared variable where the
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variables x2 and x
′
2 are the unshared variables between the two agents. When the message
is sent, the value of x1 for agent j in s is changed to be equal the value of variable x1 for
agent i in s′.
≈i→j
(Ii(s), Ij(s)) (Ii(s’), Ij(s’))
S
Figure 3.5: An example of the new social accessibility relation ≈i→ j
Thus, the main motivation behind this new definition of ≈i→ j is that the previous
definition (i.e., ∼i→ j) over specifies and over constrains the concept of illocutionary com-
munication in the sense that the accessible state for the debtor i should be the same. We
argue that only the shared variables should be the same as not only the creditor j gains more
information when moving from one state to an accessible one, but the debtor as well could
change its local state by probably gaining new information through other communications.
Furthermore, by relaxing this condition of having the same values for unshared variables,
we allow the agent to establish and participate in multiple communications while being in
the same state. The social accessibility relation ≈i→ j has the following properties:
Proposition 3.1. ≈i→ j is transitive and Euclidean.
• ≈i→ j is transitive: for any pair i, j ∈ A , if s ≈i→ j s
′ and s′ ≈i→ j s
′′ then s ≈i→ j s
′′
for all s,s′,s′′ ∈ S.
Proof. Assume s ≈i→ j s
′ and s′ ≈i→ j s
′′, for any pair i, j ∈ A . According to the
definition of ≈i→ j, it is the case that s ≈i→ j s





′) = lxi (s
′′) = lxj(s
′′).
• ≈i→ j is Euclidean: for any pair i, j ∈ A , if s ≈i→ j s
′ and s ≈i→ j s
′′ then s′ ≈i→ j s
′′
for all s,s′,s′′ ∈ S.
Proof. Assume s ≈i→ j s
′ and s ≈i→ j s
′′, for any pair i, j ∈ A . According to the
definition of ≈i→ j, we have s
′ ≈i→ j s
′′ as lxi (s






From the properties of the social and epistemic accessibility relations the following
lemmas hold.
Lemma 3.1. If s1 ≈i s2 and s2 ≈i→ j s3 then s1 ≈i→ j s3.
Proof. Assume s1 ≈i s2 and s2 ≈i→ j s3 for any pair i, j ∈A . According to the definition of
≈i, it is the case that li(s1) = li(s2). Therefore, l
x
i (s1) = l
x
i (s2) ∀x ∈ Vari∩Var j. From the
definition of≈i→ j, it is the case that l
x
i (s2) = l
x
i (s3) = l
x
j(s3) ∀x∈Vari∩Var j. Consequently,
s1 ≈i→ j s3.
Lemma 3.2. If s1 ≈i s2 and s1 ≈i→ j s3 then s2 ≈i→ j s3.
Proof. From s1≈i s2 and s1≈i→ j s3 for any pair i, j ∈ A, we get l
x
i (s1) = l
x
i (s2) and l
x
i (s1) =
lxi (s3) = l
x
j(s3) ∀x ∈Vari∩Var j. Consequently, s2 ≈i→ j s3.
The following theorem is direct from Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2:
Theorem 3.1. If s1 ≈i s2 then s1 ≈i→ j s3 iff s2 ≈i→ j s3.
This result is reasonable as for agent i, s1 and s2 are indistinguishable, so that socially
accessing to s3 from s1 or s2 should be the same.
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3.5.2 Semantics of CTLKC+
CTLKC+ has the same syntax as CTLKC. Its semantics is as follows.
Definition 3.4 (Satisfaction of CTLKC+).
Given the model M, the satisfaction of a CTLKC+ formula ϕ in a global state s, denoted
by (M,s) |= ϕ , is recursively defined as follows:
• (M,s) |= p iff p ∈ V (s);
• (M,s) |= ¬ϕ iff (M,s) 2 ϕ;
• (M,s) |= ϕ ∨ψ iff (M,s) |= ϕ or (M,s) |= ψ;
• (M,s) |= EXϕ iff there exists a path pi starting at s such that (M,pi(1)) |= ϕ;
• (M,s) |= E(ϕUψ) iff there exists a path pi starting at s such that for some k ≥ 0,
(M,pi(k)) |= ψ and (M,pi( j)) |= ϕ for all 0≤ j < k;
• (M,s) |= EGϕ iff there exists a path pi starting at s such that (M,pi(k)) |= ϕ for all
k ≥ 0;
• (M,s) |= Kiϕ iff for all global states s
′ ∈ S such that s≈i s
′, we have (M,s′) |= ϕ;
• (M,s) |=Ci→ jϕ iff for all global states s
′ ∈ S such that s≈i→ j s
′, we have (M,s′) |=
Kiϕ and (M,s
′) |= K jϕ;
• (M,s) |= Fu(Ci→ jϕ) iff there exists s
′ ∈ S such that s′≈i→ j s and (M,s
′) |=Ci→ jϕ or
there exists s′′ ∈ S and s′′ ≈i s such that (M,s
′′) |= Fu(Ci→ jϕ) or there exists s
′′ ∈ S
and s′′ ≈ j s such that (M,s
′′) |= Fu(Ci→ jϕ).
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The semantics of CTLKC+ state formulas is defined in the model M as usual (se-
mantics of CTL, see for example [41]) with modalities for reasoning about knowledge and
social commitments and their fulfillments respectively. The state formula Kiϕ is satisfied
in the model M iff the content ϕ holds in every accessible state s′ obtained by the epis-
temic accessibility relation ≈i. The state formula Ci→ jϕ is satisfied in the model M iff the
modalities Kiϕ and K jϕ hold in every accessible state s
′ obtained by the social accessibility
relation ≈i→ j. The intuition of this semantics is as follows: when i commits to j using an
illocution, the two agents become aware of the content in the accessible states. The state
formula Fu(Ci→ jϕ) is satisfied in the modelM iff, first there exists a state s
′ satisfying the
commitment from which s can be seen using the social accessibility relation ≈i→ j, or there
exists a state s′′ indistinguishable from s either for i or for j that satisfies the fulfillment
of the commitment. The intuition behind this semantics is as follows. First, a state s is
a fulfillment state if it is socially accessible from the commitment state. Once fulfillment
states are determined using this first option, fulfillment will be propagated to all the states
that are equivalent for each agent. This is because when a fulfillment is achieved, the situ-
ation should be reflected in all equivalent states for the two interacting agents (i.e., debtor
and creditor). This idea of fulfillment propagation is shown in the following theorem and
corollary.
Theorem 3.2. Let ρ ∈{i, j}. If (M,s) |=Fu(Ci→ jϕ) then ∀s
′ s.t. s′≈ρ s, we have (M,s
′) |=
Fu(Ci→ jϕ)
Proof. We prove the theorem for ≈i, the proof for ≈ j is similar. Assume that (M,s) |=
Fu(Ci→ jϕ) and ∃s
′ s.t. s′≈i s and (M,s
′) |=¬Fu(Ci→ jϕ). From the semantics of Fu(Ci→ jϕ),
the three or-conditions are not satisfied. Consequently, ∀s′′ s.t. s′′ ≈i s
′, we have (M,s′′) |=
¬Fu(Ci→ jϕ). Since s≈i s
′ as ≈i is symmetric, we have contradiction with the assumption
when s′′ = s, so we are done.
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Corollary 3.1. Let ρ ∈ {i, j}. If (M,s) |= Fu(Ci→ jϕ) then ∀s
′ s.t. s ≈ρ s
′, we have
(M,s′) |= Fu(Ci→ jϕ)
Proof. The result is direct from Theorem 3.2 since the accessibility relation ≈ρ is symmet-
ric.
3.5.3 Fixing Paradoxes
As discussed in Section 3.4, the first problem in CTLKC is that each state accessible from s
using ∼i→ j is also accessible from the same state using ≈i. This problem causes paradoxes
P1 to P5, P7 and P9. Using the new model of CTLKC+, each state accessible from s by
≈i→ j is not necessarily accessible from that state using≈i. The second problem that causes
P6 and P8 in CTLKC is that the set of states accessible from a given state s by the social
accessibility relation ∼i→ j is independent from the epistemic accessibility relation ≈ j of
the creditor j. In CTLKC+, this problem is fixed using the new semantics of commitments
and fulfillment. In the rest of this section, each agent is associated with two variables, where
the first one is shared.
1. Kiϕ →Ci→ jϕ, for all j ∈ A where i 6= j is not valid.
Model 6
Figure 3.6 depicts a counterexample for paradox P1. In this model, the global state
s0 is labeled by the knowledge (i.e., (M,s0) |= Kiϕ) because all the accessible states
using the epistemic accessibility relation ≈i satisfy ϕ . However, s0 is not labeled by
the commitment (i.e., (M,s0) |= ¬Ci→ jϕ) since the socially accessible state s2 does
not satisfy K jϕ because of the existence of s4, which is epistemically accessible from
s2 for j (i.e., s2 ≈ j s4).
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Figure 3.6: Model 6
Model 7
Figure 3.7 depicts a counterexample for paradox P2. In this model, (M,s0) |= KiK jϕ
since all the accessible states using ≈i satisfy K jϕ . However, (M,s0) |= ¬Ci→ jϕ
because of the existence of the socially accessible state s3 that does not satisfy, for
instance, Kiϕ .
3. KiK jϕ →C j→iϕ such that i 6= j is not valid.
Model 8
Figure 3.8 depicts a counterexample for paradox P3. In this model, (M,s0) |=KiK jϕ ,
but (M,s0) |= ¬Ci→ jϕ because it is not the case that (M,s3) |= Kiϕ .
4. Ci→ jϕ → Ki(Ci→ jϕ) where i 6= j.



























Figure 3.7: Model 7
of knowledge, there exists a state s′ accessible from s using ≈i such that (M,s
′) |=
¬Ci→ jϕ . Thus, from the semantics of commitments, there exists a state s
′′ accessible
from s′ using ≈i→ j such that (M,s
′) |= ¬Kiϕ ∨¬K jϕ . Using Theorem 3.1, s
′′ is also
accessible from s through ≈i→ j, thus the contradiction as (M,s) |=Ci→ jϕ .
5. Fu(Ci→ jϕ)→ Kiϕ where i 6= j.
Proof. Assume that (M,s) |= Fu(Ci→ jϕ). From the semantics of Fu(Ci→ jϕ), three
options are to be considered. Let us consider the first option, the second and third
options will follow from Theorem 3.2 and Corollary 3.1. According to the first option,
there exists a global state s′ ∈ S such that s′ ≈i→ j s and (M,s
′) |=Ci→ jϕ . From the
semantics ofCi→ jϕ , we have (M,s) |= Kiϕ , so we are done with the first option.
According to the propagation property established from Theorem 3.2 and Corollary
3.1, (M,s) |= Fu(Ci→ jϕ) iff ∀s
′ ∈ S such that s≈i s


























Figure 3.8: Model 8
that for one of those s′ states (M,s′) |= ¬Kiϕ . Since ≈i is an equivalence relation, it
follows that ∀s′ ∈ S such that s≈i s
′, (M,s′) |=¬Kiϕ , which is contradictory with the
result of the first option; thus the postulate.
6. Fu(Ci→ jϕ)→ K jϕ where i 6= j.
Proof. The proof is similar to the previous one, but with respect to j.
7. Fu(Ci→ jϕ)→ KiFu(Ci→ jϕ) where i 6= j.
Proof. The postulate is direct from Corollary 3.1 and the semantics of Kiϕ .
8. Fu(Ci→ jϕ)→ K jFu(Ci→ jϕ) where i 6= j.
Proof. The postulate is direct from Corollary 3.1 and the semantics of K jϕ .
9. (Ci→ jϕ ∧Ki(ϕ → ψ))→Ci→ jψ is not valid.
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Proof. The non-validity follows from the fact that from a given state, states accessible
via≈i→ j are distinct from those accessible via≈i. Thus, an accessible state via≈i→ j
from a state s satisfyingCi→ jϕ ∧Ki(ϕ → ψ) could satisfy (ϕ ∧¬ψ). Thus, using the
semantics of commitments it follows that s |= ¬Ci→ jψ .
Moreover, in addition to the properties of knowledge (in CTLK) and commitments
(in CTLC) such as Kiϕ → ϕ and Fu(Ci→ jϕ)→ ϕ that hold in CTLKC
+ (the proofs are
straightforward), the following properties are also satisfied in this logic:
1. Property 1: Ci→ jϕ → ϕ is satisfiable but not valid.
Proof. The non-validity follows from the fact that ≈i→ j is not reflexive.
This property says that when an agent commits to bring about a proposition, the
proposition does not have to be true. This reflects the limited capability of the agent
as it could not be aware about what is true in the current state.
2. Property 2: Ci→ jϕ → Kiϕ is satisfiable but not valid.
Proof. The non-validity follows from the fact that a state can be accessible via ≈i
without being accessible via ≈i→ j, such that this state satisfies ¬ϕ .
This property conveys the fact that committing to bring about a proposition ϕ should
not, in all the cases, imply the knowledge of ϕ . This means, the agent’s sincerity
should not be taken as granted. In the models where the formula is satisfiable (glob-
ally in all paths), agents will be sincere; otherwise, they are not all the time sincere,
which is the general case in open MASs.
3. Property 3: (Ci→ jϕ ∧K j(ϕ → ψ))→Ci→ jψ is satisfiable but not valid.
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Proof. The non-validity follows from the fact that from a given state, states accessible
via≈i→ j are distinct from those accessible via≈ j . Thus, an accessible state via≈i→ j
from a state s satisfyingCi→ jϕ∧K j(ϕ →ψ) could satisfy (ϕ∧¬ψ). Therefore, using
the semantics of commitments it follows that s |= ¬Ci→ jψ .
4. Property 4: (Ci→ j(ϕ → ψ)∧K jϕ)→Ci→ jψ is satisfiable but not valid.
This property is very similar to Property 3 and can be proved in the same way. By
defining the consistent logic (CTLKC+) that can reason about knowledge and commitments
simultaneously and fixes the identified paradoxes, we answer the fourth research question
[Q4].
3.6 Summary
To capture the interaction between knowledge and social commitments from the seman-
tics perspective, a new combined temporal logic, called CTLKC, is first introduced in this
chapter. CTLKC logic simply combines the logic of knowledge CTLK and the logic of
communicative commitments CTLC as presented in the literature. This logic served as a
language to express a set of postulates that are used to reason about both knowledge and so-
cial commitments. By analyzing such postulates, we identified some paradoxes that should
be addressed in any consistent logic combining these two modalities. To overcome and
solve the paradoxes identified in CTLKC, we introduced CTLKC+, a new consistent logic
for knowledge, communicative commitments and their interactions. We presented a new
semantics of commitments and their fulfillment based on a new social accessibility rela-
tion. In the next chapter, we will investigate the soundness and completeness of the logic




On the Soundness and Completeness of
the CTLKC+ Logic
In this chapter1, we develop a formal and systematic approach to prove the soundness and
completeness of the CTLKC+ logic using correspondence theory for modal logics [92]. To
do so, we introduce a set of reasoning postulates in CTLKC+ and correspond them to cer-
tain classes of frames providing the required proofs. We illustrate each reasoning postulate
using a concrete application example. We adopted the interpreted systems as an underlying
formalism over which our developed postulates are interpreted. The existence of such cor-
respondence allows us to prove that the logic generated by any subset of these postulates is
sound and complete with respect to the models that are based on the corresponding frames.
4.1 Introduction
Soundness and completeness of a given modal logic can be summarized as follows: Given
a set of axioms constructed from a modal logic, is there any relationship between those
1The results of this chapter are published in [1].
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axioms and certain frames?
To answer this question, in this chapter, we use Correspondence theory for modal
logic, which was introduced by van Benthem [92], to prove the soundness and completeness
of the CTLKC+ logic. Correspondence theory, a subfield of the model theory, reflects a
formal analysis of the relationship between classes of frames and modal logics [55].
In [84] Segerberg introduced the early completeness theorems in modal logic as fol-
lows: “modal logic L is determined by a class R of Kripke frames”. Those theorems were
first applied to the minimum modal logic K [92]. In this context, two perspectives emerge
here. First, given a class R of Kripke frames, we have to find an axiomatisation in a given
modal logic L. Second, given a modal logic L, we have to find a certain class R of Kripke
frames in which the given logic is complete. Note that, the latter perspective represents the
current direction in modal logic.
In this chapter, we use Benthem’s correspondence theory for modal logic to prove
the soundness and completeness of the logic of knowledge and commitments (CTLKC+).
This process of proving the soundness and completeness of CTLKC+ can be seen as a step
towards demonstrating and evaluating the efficiency and consistency of CTLKC+ from a
new perspective. In particular, as depicted in Figure 4.1, we develop a set of reasoning pos-
tulates in CTLKC+ and correspond them to certain classes of frames providing the required
proofs. Consequently, we prove that the logic generated by any subset of those postulates is
sound and complete with respect to the models that are based on the corresponding frames.
The main strength of the proposed approach lies in the fact that all the results are
obtained through the use of solid formal theories. Moreover, the developed axioms are
associated with their corresponding proofs based on models defined over the frames. This
shows that the proposed logical model is correct and any application built on it would not
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Figure 4.1: A schematic view of our approach
purely theoretical foundation could be seen as a potential weakness as the model could be
considered abstract and far from any real and concrete application. To handle this issue and
facilitate the reader’s understanding of this chapter, we provide a concrete application , the
NetBill protocol [90], as a running example throughout the chapter over which the axioms
are illustrated.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we address the prob-
lem of corresponding the reasoning postulates to certain classes of frames and then we
prove the soundness and completeness of the CTLKC+ logic. Finally, we conclude the
chapter in Section 4.3.
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4.2 Corresponding Reasoning Postulates
In this section, we use the NetBill payment protocol [90] which was presented in Section
3.3.1 as an application example, taken from the e-commerce domain, to illustrate the pro-
posed reasoning postulates. After that, we consider the reasoning postulates along with
their corresponding classes of frames. Finally, we explain how to use the correspondence
results in proving the soundness and completeness of CTLKC+. It is worth noticing that, to
simplify the proofs of the correspondence between the proposed reasoning postulates and
their related frames, the semantics of the Fu(Ci→ jϕ) in the CTLKC
+ logic is redefined
in such a way to avoid the recursion that appeared in the second and third options of the
semantics of the fulfillment in Chapter 3 (Section 3.5) as follows: 2
• (M ,s) |= Fu(Ci→ jϕ) iff there exists s
′ ∈ S such that s′ ≈i→ j s and (M ,s
′) |=Ci→ jϕ
or there exists s′ ∈ S such that s≈i s
′ and there exists s′′ ∈ S such that s′′ ≈i→ j s
′ and
(M ,s′′) |=Ci→ jϕ or there exists s
′ ∈ S such that s≈ j s
′ and there exists s′′ ∈ S such
that s′′ ≈i→ j s
′ and (M ,s′′) |=Ci→ jϕ .
However, the two semantics are equivalent.
4.2.1 Reasoning Postulates and Corresponding Frames
In this section, we follow Benthem’s [92] notion of correspondence theory for modal logic
in proving the correspondence between our proposed reasoning postulates and their related
classes of frames. In our approach, we first give a name, formalization and meaning for
each postulate. After that, we correspond the postulates to certain classes of frames and
2The semantics of Fu(Ci→ jϕ) in Chapter 3 (Section 3.5) was defined as follows:
(M ,s) |= Fu(Ci→ jϕ) iff there exists s
′ ∈ S such that s′ ≈i→ j s and (M ,s
′) |=Ci→ jϕ or
there exists s′′ ∈ S and s′′ ≈i s such that (M ,s
′′) |= Fu(Ci→ jϕ) or
there exists s′′ ∈ S and s′′ ≈ j s such that (M ,s
′′) |= Fu(Ci→ jϕ)
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provide the required proofs. Thereafter, we present a discussion that illustrates the impor-
tance of each postulate in MASs and how they were addressed in the literature. It is worth
mentioning that for valid formulas in any frame, we will not discuss the correspondence
since they correspond to all possible frames.
P1. [Fulfillment]
Formalization: Fu(Ci→ jϕ)→ ϕ .
Meaning: When a commitment is fulfilled, its content holds.
Correspondence: For any frame F = (W,≈i,≈ j,≈i→ j), F |= Fu(Ci→ jϕ)→ ϕ iff
F is reflexive and symmetric with respect to ≈i or ≈ j.
Proof. (⇐) Suppose that F = (W,≈i,≈ j,≈i→ j) is reflexive and symmetric with
respect to ≈i or ≈ j and let M = (W,≈i,≈ j,≈i→ j,V ) be any model based on F .
Given s1 ∈W , we must show (M ,s1) |= Fu(Ci→ jϕ)→ ϕ . Suppose that (M ,s1) |=
Fu(Ci→ jϕ). We must show (M ,s1) |= ϕ . From the semantics of Fu(Ci→ jϕ), three
options are to be considered. According to the first option, there exists s2 ∈ W
such that s2 ≈i→ j s1 and (M ,s2) |=Ci→ jϕ . From the semantics of Ci→ jϕ , we have
(M ,s1) |= Kiϕ ∧K jϕ . From the semantics of Kiϕ , for all s3 ∈W such that s1 ≈i s3
we have (M ,s3) |= ϕ . Since F is reflexive, we have s1 ≈i s1. Thus, (M ,s1) |= ϕ .
So, we are done for the first option.
For the second and third options, there exists two states s2 and s3 ∈W such that
s1 ≈i s2, s3 ≈i→ j s2, and (M ,s3) |= (Ci→ jϕ). From the semantics ofCi→ jϕ , we have
(M ,s2) |= Kiϕ ∧K jϕ . Since F is symmetric, then s2 ≈i s1. Therefore, from the
semantics of Kiϕ , (M ,s1) |= ϕ as desired.
(⇒)We argue by contraposition. Suppose that F is not reflexive and not symmetric.
We must show F 2 Fu(Ci→ jϕ)→ ϕ . Using Remark 2.1, it is enough to show F 2
64
Fu(Ci→ jp)→ p for some sentence letter p. Consider the model M = (W,≈i,≈ j
,≈i→ j,V ) based on F . Assume (M ,s1) |= Fu(Ci→ jp). From the semantics of
Fu(Ci→ jp), there exists s2 ∈W such that s2 ≈i→ j s1 and (M ,s2) |= Ci→ jp. From
the semantics of Ci→ jp, we have (M ,s1) |= Kip∧K jp. From the semantics of Kip,
for all s3 ∈W such that s1 ≈i s3 we have (M ,s3) |= p. Assume (M ,s1) |= ¬p.
Since F is not reflexive, then it might not be the case that s1 ≈i s1 and so (M ,s1) |=
Fu(Ci→ jp)∧¬p. Thus, F 2 Fu(Ci→ jp)→ p.
Discussion: It is obvious that this postulate is reasonable and realistic because in gen-
eral when an agent fulfills its commitment, the content of this commitment holds at
the same state. For example, with respect to the NetBill protocol, once the customer
pays the agreed amount of money (i.e., fulfills its commitment), then the payment
(i.e., the content of the commitment) holds. Formally,
Fu(CCus→Mer sendPayment) →sendPayment. This postulate is incorporated in the
axioms of fulfillment introduced in [7]. Furthermore, a similar postulate is also in-
corporated in [104, 20, 32, 21].
P2. [Knowing the content of its own fulfilled commitment]
Formalization: Fu(Ci→ jϕ)→ Kiϕ .
Meaning: An agent knows the content of its fulfilled commitment.
Correspondence: For any frame F = (W,≈i,≈ j,≈i→ j), F |= Fu(Ci→ jϕ)→ Kiϕ
iff F is symmetric and transitive with respect to ≈i.
Proof. (⇐) Suppose that F = (W,≈i,≈ j,≈i→ j) is symmetric and transitive with
respect to ≈i and let M = (W,≈i,≈ j,≈i→ j,V ) be any model based on F . Given
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s1 ∈W , we must show that (M ,s1) |= Fu(Ci→ jϕ)→ Kiϕ . Suppose that (M ,s1) |=
Fu(Ci→ jϕ). We must show (M ,s1) |= Kiϕ . From the semantics of Fu(Ci→ jϕ),
three options are to be considered. According to the first option, there exists s2 ∈W
such that s2 ≈i→ j s1 and (M ,s2) |=Ci→ jϕ . From the semantics of Ci→ jϕ , we have
(M ,s1) |= Kiϕ ∧K jϕ . So, we are done for the first option.
For the second and third options, there exists two states s2 and s3 ∈W such that
s1 ≈i s2, s3 ≈i→ j s2, and (M ,s3) |= (Ci→ jϕ). From the semantics ofCi→ jϕ , we have
(M ,s2) |= Kiϕ ∧K jϕ . Assume, (M ,s1) |= ¬Kiϕ . From the semantics of Kiϕ , there
exists s4 ∈W such that s1 ≈i s4 and (M ,s4) |= ¬ϕ . Since F is symmetric, then
s2 ≈i s1. Further, since F is transitive, then s2 ≈i s4. Therefore, from the semantics
of Kiϕ , we have (M ,s4) |= ϕ . Thus, we have contradiction and so (M ,s1) |= Kiϕ as
desired.
(⇒) Suppose that F is not symmetric and not transitive. We must show F 2
Fu(Ci→ jϕ)→ Kiϕ . We argue by contraposition. Consider the model M = (W,≈i
,≈ j,≈i→ j,V ) based on F . Suppose that (M ,s1) |= Fu(Ci→ jp). From the semantics
of fulfillment, there exists two states s2 and s3 ∈W such that s1 ≈i s2, s3 ≈i→ j s2, and
(M ,s3) |= (Ci→ jp). From the semantics of Ci→ jp, we have (M ,s2) |= Kip∧K jp.
Assume (M ,s1) |= ¬Kip. From the semantics of Kip, there exists s4 ∈W such that
s1 ≈i s4 and (M ,s4) |= ¬p. Since F is not symmetric, then it might not be the case
that s2≈i s1. Further, sinceF not transitive, then it might not be the case that s2≈i s4.
Therefore, (M ,s1) |= Fu(Ci→ jp)∧¬Kip. Consequently, F 2 Fu(Ci→ jp)→ Kip.
Discussion: This postulate highlights the fact that an agent knows the content of its
fulfilled commitment. Otherwise, it could happen that the agent does not know about
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its action. Hence, the agent might repeat it again and re-fulfill its commitment. For
instance, from the NetBill protocol, assume that the merchant delivers the required
goods to the customer (i.e., fulfills its commitment of delivering the goods). Apply-
ing the postulate, Fu(CMer→CusdeliverGoods)→ KMerdeliverGoods, reveals that the
merchant should be aware about the content of its commitment after having fulfilled
it. This postulate is incorporated in our reasoning postulates in Chapter 3.
P3. [Knowing the content of the fulfilled commitment]
Formalization: Fu(Ci→ jϕ)→ K jϕ .
Meaning: An agent knows the content of the fulfilled commitment.
Correspondence: For any frame F = (W,≈i,≈ j,≈i→ j), F |= Fu(Ci→ jϕ)→ K jϕ
iff F is symmetric and transitive with respect to ≈ j.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of P2, but with respect to j.
Discussion: This postulate conveys the fact that the creditor knows the content of the
fulfilled commitment. The postulate is reasonable as the creditor should be aware of
the satisfaction of the commitment directed to it once this fulfillment occurs. Oth-
erwise, the creditor might require the debtor to re-discharge the commitment. In the
previous example, assume that the merchant delivers the required goods to the cus-
tomer (i.e., fulfills its commitment). Thus, the customer should know that the goods
has been delivered. Formally, Fu(CMer→Cus deliverGoods) → KCus deliverGoods.
Otherwise, the customer could argue that no goods has been delivered, so it will
require that a new delivery be performed, and the situation can be repeated. This
postulate is incorporated in our reasoning postulates in Chapter 3.
P4. [Knowing the fulfillment of its own commitment]
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Formalization: Fu(Ci→ jϕ)→ Ki(Fu(Ci→ jϕ)).
Meaning: An agent knows that it fulfills its own commitment.
Correspondence: For any frame F = (W,≈i,≈ j,≈i→ j),
F |= Fu(Ci→ jϕ)→ Ki(Fu(Ci→ jϕ)) iff F is symmetric with respect to ≈i.
Proof. (⇐) Suppose that F = (W,≈i,≈ j,≈i→ j) is symmetric with respect to ≈i
and let M = (W,≈i,≈ j,≈i→ j,V ) be any model based on F . Given s1 ∈W , we must
show (M ,s1) |=Fu(Ci→ jϕ)→Ki(Fu(Ci→ jϕ)). Suppose that (M ,s1) |=Fu(Ci→ jϕ).
We must show (M ,s1) |= Ki(Fu(Ci→ jϕ)). From the semantics of Fu(Ci→ jϕ), three
options are to be considered. According to the first option, there exists s2 ∈ W
such that s2 ≈i→ j s1 and (M ,s2) |=Ci→ jϕ . From the semantics of Ci→ jϕ , we have
(M ,s1) |= Kiϕ ∧K jϕ . Assume (M ,s1) |= ¬Ki(Fu(Ci→ jϕ)). From the semantics of
knowledge, there exists s3 ∈W such that s1≈i s3 and (M ,s3) |=¬Fu(Ci→ jϕ). Using
the semantics of Fu(Ci→ jϕ), the three or-conditions are not satisfied. Therefore, us-
ing Corollary 3.1, ∀s4 ∈W such that s3≈i s4, we have (M ,s4) |=¬Fu(Ci→ jϕ). Since
F is symmetric, then s3≈i s1. Thus, we have contradiction with the assumption when
s1 = s4, and so (M ,s3) |= Fu(Ci→ jϕ). Consequently, (M ,s1) |= Ki(Fu(Ci→ jϕ)).
For the second and third options, there exists two states s2 and s3 ∈W such that
s1 ≈i s2, s3 ≈i→ j s2, and (M ,s3) |= (Ci→ jϕ). From the semantics of Ci→ jϕ , we
have (M ,s2) |= Kiϕ ∧K jϕ . Assume, (M ,s1) |= ¬Ki(Fu(Ci→ jϕ)). According to
the semantics of knowledge, there exists s4 ∈W such that s1 ≈i s4 and (M ,s4) |=
¬Fu(Ci→ jϕ). From the semantics of Fu(Ci→ jϕ), the three or-conditions are not sat-
isfied. Therefore, using Corollary 3.1, ∀s5 ∈W such that s4 ≈i s5, we have (M ,s5) |=
¬Fu(Ci→ jϕ). Since F is symmetric, then s4 ≈i s1. Thus, we have contradiction
with the assumption when s1 = s5, and so (M ,s4) |= Fu(Ci→ jϕ). Consequently,
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(M ,s1) |= Ki(Fu(Ci→ jϕ)) as desired.
(⇒) We argue by contraposition. Suppose that F is not symmetric. We must
show F 2 Fu(Ci→ jϕ) → Ki(Fu(Ci→ jϕ)). Consider the model M = (W,≈i,≈ j
,≈i→ j,V ) based on F . Assume (M ,s1) |= Fu(Ci→ jp). From the semantics of
Fu(Ci→ jp), there exists s2 ∈W such that s2 ≈i→ j s1 and (M ,s2) |=Ci→ jp. Using the
semantics of Ci→ jp, we have (M ,s1) |= Kip∧K jp. To this end, assume (M ,s1) |=
¬Ki(Fu(Ci→ jp)). According to the semantics of knowledge, there exists s3 ∈W such
that s1 ≈i s3 and (M ,s3) |= ¬Fu(Ci→ jp). From the semantics of Fu(Ci→ jϕ), the
three or-conditions are not satisfied. Therefore, using Corollary 3.1, for all s4 such
that s3 ≈i s4, we have (M ,s4) |= ¬Fu(Ci→ jϕ). Since F is not symmetric, then it
might not be the case that s3 ≈i s1. Thus, (M ,s1) |= Fu(Ci→ jp)∧¬Ki(Fu(Ci→ jp)).
So, we are done.
Discussion: It is clear that this postulate has certain importance in open MASs. Ac-
tually, it reflects the agent’s intentionality of its action to fulfill its own commitment.
The validity of this postulate is significant as violating this postulates would mean
that the agent is not aware about its action of discharging (fulfilling) its own com-
mitment. Consequently, the agent could discharge the commitment many times. For
example, assume that the customer fulfills its commitment of paying the required
amount of money to the merchant, then the customer should know that. This is for-
mally denoted as: Fu(CCus→Mer sendPayment)→ KCusFu(CCus→Mer sendPayment).
This postulate is incorporated in our reasoning postulates in Chapter 3.
P5. [Knowing the fulfillment of the commitment]
Formalization: Fu(Ci→ jϕ)→ K jFu(Ci→ jϕ).
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Meaning: An agent knows the fulfillment of the commitment.
Correspondence: For any frame F = (W,≈i,≈ j,≈i→ j),
F |= Fu(Ci→ jϕ)→ K j(Fu(Ci→ jϕ)) iff F is symmetric with respect with ≈ j.
Proof. The proof is similar to the previous one, but with respect to j.
Discussion: This postulate emphasizes the awareness of the creditor about the ful-
fillment of the debtor’s commitment. In particular, it captures the intuition that, in
open MASs, fulfilling the commitment is public. For example, assume that the mer-
chant fulfills its commitment of delivering the required goods to the customer. This
fulfillment should be public so that the customer can recognize it. It can be formally
expressed as: Fu(CMer→CusdeliverGoods) → KCusFu(CMer→Cus deliverGoods). If
this postulate is violated, then serious problems could happen. Indeed, being aware
about the fulfillment of the commitment, prevents the creditor from asking the debtor
to fulfill it again. This postulate is incorporated in our reasoning postulates in Chapter
3.
P6. [Knowing its own commitment]
Formalization: Ci→ jϕ → Ki(Ci→ jϕ).
Meaning: An agent knows about its own commitment.
Correspondence: For any frame F = (W,≈i,≈ j,≈i→ j), F |=Ci→ jϕ → Ki(Ci→ jϕ)
iff F is ES.
Proof. (⇐) Suppose thatF = (W,≈i,≈ j,≈i→ j) is ES and letM = (W,≈i,≈ j,≈i→ j
,V ) be any model based on F . Given s1 ∈W , we must show (M ,s1) |=Ci→ jϕ →
Ki(Ci→ jϕ). Suppose that (M ,s1) |= Ci→ jϕ . We must show (M ,s1) |= Ki(Ci→ jϕ).
Further, we must show (M ,s2) |= Ci→ jϕ for any s2 ∈ W and s1 ≈i s2. Assume
(M ,s2) |= ¬Ci→ jϕ . From the semantic of Ci→ jϕ , there exists s3 ∈ W such that
s2 ≈i→ j s3 and (M ,s3) |= ¬Kiϕ ∨¬K jϕ . Based on the definition of ES, we have
s1 ≈i→ j s3 and so (M ,s3) |= Kiϕ ∧K jϕ which is a contradiction. Thus, (M ,s2) |=
Ci→ jϕ and therefore, (M ,s1) |= Ki(Ci→ jϕ). Consequently, (M ,s1) |= Ci→ jϕ →
Ki(Ci→ jϕ) as desired.
(⇒) Suppose that F is not ES. We must show F 2Ci→ jϕ → Ki(Ci→ jϕ). Consider
the model M = (W,≈i,≈ j,≈i→ j,V ) based on F . Using contraposition, suppose
that (M ,s1) |= Ci→ jp. Furthermore, assume there exists s2 ∈W such that s1 ≈i s2
and (M ,s2) |=¬Ci→ jp. From the semantics of commitment, there exists s3 ∈W such
that s2 ≈i→ j s3 and (M ,s3) |= ¬Kip∨¬K jp. Since F is not ES, then it might not
the case that s1 ≈i→ j s3. Therefore, (M ,s1) 2 Ki(Ci→ jp). Consequently, (M ,s1) |=
Ci→ jp∧¬Ki(Ci→ jp) and so, F 2Ci→ jp→ Ki(Ci→ jp), as desired.
Discussion: Being committed to do something, the agent (i.e., the debtor) has to be
aware about this action. This postulate is reasonable to be applied in MASs as agents
should realize their own placed commitments. To illustrate the importance of this
postulate, let us assume that the merchant commits toward the customer to deliver the
required goods. Applying this postulate,
CMer→Cus deliverGoods → KMer (CMer→Cus deliverGoods), it is obvious that the
committing agent (i.e., the merchant) should know about this particular commitment
as it does not make sense for an agent to create a commitment and in the same time it
is not aware about the consequences of this action. Otherwise, this would mean that
the commitment is made accidently. This postulate is incorporated in our reasoning
postulates in Chapter 3. Furthermore, a similar postulate is also incorporated in [81].
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P7. [R-Conjoin]
Formalization: (Ci→ jϕ1)∧ (Ci→ jϕ2)→Ci→ j(ϕ1∧ϕ2).
Meaning: Agent i would become committed towards agent j that both ϕ1 and ϕ2 are
held if i individually commits toward j that ϕ1 holds and i commits toward j that ϕ2
holds.
Proof. Given s1 ∈W , we must show (M ,s1) |= (Ci→ jϕ1)∧ (Ci→ jϕ2)→Ci→ j(ϕ1∧
ϕ2). Assume that (M ,s1) |= ((Ci→ jϕ1)∧(Ci→ jϕ2))∧¬(Ci→ j(ϕ1∧ϕ2). From the se-
mantics ofCi→ jϕ , for all global states s2 ∈ S such that s1≈i→ j s2, we have (M ,s2) |=
(Kiϕ1 ∧K jϕ1)∧ (Kiϕ2 ∧K jϕ2)∧ (¬Ki(ϕ1 ∧ϕ2)∨¬K j(ϕ1 ∧ϕ2)). Further, from the
semantics of knowledge, there exists s3 ∈ S such that s2 ≈i s3 and (M ,s3) |= (ϕ1∧
¬ϕ1)∨(ϕ2∧¬ϕ2). Thus, we have contradiction. Consequently, (Ci→ jϕ1)∧(Ci→ jϕ2)
→Ci→ j(ϕ1∧ϕ2). So, the postulates.
Discussion:
The validity of this postulate is captured from the fact that agent i has the ability to
have more than one commitment towards the same agent j at the same time. Sup-
pose, for instance, that the merchant commits toward the customer to deliver the
goods and it also commits toward the same customer to send a receipt, then the mer-
chant would be committed towards the customer to deliver the goods and send the
receipt. Formally, (CMer→Cus deliverGoods) ∧ (CMer→Cus sendReciept)→CMer→Cus
(deliverGoods∧ sendReciept). This postulate is incorporated in [88, 32, 21].
P8. [Knowing its R-conjoin commitment]
Formalization: (Ci→ jϕ1)∧ (Ci→ jϕ2)→ Ki(Ci→ j(ϕ1∧ϕ2)).
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Meaning: An agent knows about its conjoin commitment.
Correspondence: For any frame F = (W,≈i,≈ j,≈i→ j),
F |= (Ci→ jϕ1)∧ (Ci→ jϕ2)→ Ki(Ci→ j(ϕ1∧ϕ2)) iff F is ES.
Proof. Based on Postulate P7, (M ,s1) |= (Ci→ jϕ1)∧ (Ci→ jϕ2) → Ci→ j(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2).
Thus, it is enough to prove (M ,s1) |= Ci→ j(ϕ1 ∧ϕ2)→ Ki(Ci→ j(ϕ1 ∧ϕ2)) which
can be proved in a way similar to P6.
Discussion: The validity of this postulate is captured from the fact that an agent
knows about its own commitment [2]. Consequently, in the previous example, the
merchant should know that it would be committed towards the same customer to de-
liver the goods and send the receipt. Formally, (CMer→Cus deliverGoods)∧ (CMer→Cus
sendReciept)→ KMer(CMer→Cus (deliverGoods∧ sendReceipt)).
P9. [Commitment’s chain]
Formalization: (Ci→ jϕ)∧ (Ci→ j(ϕ → ψ))→Ci→ jψ .
Meaning: Agent i can commit to a chain (implication).
Proof. Assume that (M ,s1) |= (Ci→ jϕ)∧(Ci→ j(ϕ →ψ))∧¬(Ci→ jψ). From the se-
mantics of commitment, for all s2 ∈ S such that s1≈i→ j s2, we have (M ,s2) |= (Kiϕ∧
K jϕ)∧ (Ki(ϕ → ψ)∧K j(ϕ → ψ)). Using the K axiom of knowledge, (M ,s2) |=
Kiψ ∧K jψ . Since s1 ≈i→ j s2, then (M ,s1) |=Ci→ jψ which contradicts our assump-
tion.
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Discussion: This postulate shows that CTLKC+ is closed under strict implication.
This postulate is integrated in [88, 32].
P10. [Knowing its commitment’s chain]
Formalization: (Ci→ jϕ)∧ (Ci→ j(ϕ → ψ))→ Ki(Ci→ jψ).
Meaning: Knowledge of the commitments is closed under strict implication.
Correspondence: For any frame F = (W,≈i,≈ j,≈i→ j),
F |= (Ci→ jϕ)∧ (Ci→ j(ϕ → ψ))→ Ki(Ci→ jψ) iff F is ES.
Proof. Based on Postulate P9, (M ,s1) |=(Ci→ jϕ)∧(Ci→ j(ϕ →ψ))→Ci→ jψ . Thus,
it is enough to prove (M ,s1) |=Ci→ jψ → Ki(Ci→ jψ) which was proved in P6.
Discussion: This postulate conveys the fact that an agent knows about its implied
commitment.
P11. [Weaken commitment]
Formalization: Ci→ j(ϕ1∧ϕ2)→Ci→ jϕ1.
Meaning: Committing to a conjunction implies committing to each part of the con-
junction.
Proof. Given s1 ∈W , we must show (M ,s1) |=Ci→ j(ϕ1∧ϕ2)→Ci→ jϕ1. Assume
that (M ,s1) |= Ci→ j(ϕ1 ∧ϕ2)∧¬(Ci→ jϕ1). From the semantics of Ci→ jϕ , for all
global states s2 ∈ S such that s1 ≈i→ j s2, we have (M ,s2) |= Ki(ϕ1∧ϕ2)∧K j(ϕ1∧
ϕ2). Thus, (M ,s2) |= Kiϕ1∧K jϕ1. Therefore, (M ,s1) |=Ci→ jϕ1 which contradicts
our assumption. So, the postulate.
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Discussion: To clarify this postulate, consider the following example. In the NetBill
protocol, if the merchant commits to send both the required goods and the receipt,
then the merchant commits to send the goods. Formally, CMer→Cus (deliverGoods ∧
sendReceipt) →CMer→Cus deliverGoods. This postulate is incorporated in [88, 32,
21].
P12. [Knowing its weakened commitment]
Formalization: Ci→ j(ϕ1∧ϕ2)→ Ki(Ci→ jϕ1).
Meaning: An agent knows about each part of its conjuncted commitment.
Correspondence: For any frame F = (W,≈i,≈ j,≈i→ j), F |= Ci→ j(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)→
Ki(Ci→ jϕ1) iff F is ES.
Proof. Based on Postulate P11, (M ,s1) |=Ci→ j(ϕ1∧ϕ2)→Ci→ jϕ1. So, it is enough
to prove (M ,s1) |=Ci→ jϕ1→ Ki(Ci→ jϕ1) which was proved in P6.
Discussion: This postulate shows that if an agent commits to a conjunction, then it
will be aware of its own commitment to each part of the conjunction.
P13. [Weaken fulfillment]
Formalization: Fu(Ci→ j(ϕ1∧ϕ2))→ Fu(Ci→ jϕ1).
Meaning: If i fulfills a conjunction, i is also fulfills each part of the conjunction.
Proof. Assume that (M ,s1) |=Fu(Ci→ j(ϕ1∧ϕ2))∧¬Fu(Ci→ jϕ1). From the seman-
tics of Fu(Ci→ jϕ), the three fulfillment options are to be considered. According to
the first option, there exists s2 ∈W such that s2 ≈i→ j s1 and (M ,s2) |=Ci→ j(ϕ1∧ϕ2)
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and for all s ∈W such that s ≈i→ j s1 (M ,s) |= ¬Ci→ jϕ1. Using P11, we have con-
tradiction when s = s2. Thus, (M ,s1) |= Fu(Ci→ j(ϕ1∧ϕ2))∧Fu(Ci→ jϕ1). So, we
are done for the first option.
For the second and third options, there exists two states s2 and s3 ∈W such that
s1 ≈i s2, s3 ≈i→ j s2, and (M ,s3) |=Ci→ j(ϕ1∧ϕ2) and for all s ∈W such that s≈i→ j
s2 (M ,s) |= ¬Ci→ jϕ1. Using P11, we have contradiction when s = s3. There-
fore, (M ,s3) |= Ci→ j(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) ∧Ci→ jϕ1 and so (M ,s2) |= Fu(Ci→ j(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)) ∧
Fu((Ci→ jϕ1)). Using Corollary 3.1, (M ,s1) |= Fu(Ci→ j(ϕ1∧ϕ2))∧Fu((Ci→ jϕ1))
as desired.
Discussion: To clarify the postulate, consider the following example if the mer-
chant fulfills its commitment of sending both the required goods and the receipt,
then the merchant fulfills sending the goods. Formally, Fu(CMer→Cus (deliverGoods
∧ sendReceipt))→ Fu(CMer→Cus deliverGoods).
P14. [Knowing its weakened fulfillment]
Formalization: Fu(Ci→ j(ϕ1∧ϕ2))→ Ki(Fu(Ci→ jϕ1)).
Meaning: An agent knows about each part of its conjuncted fulfillment.
Correspondence: For any frameF =(W,≈i,≈ j,≈i→ j),F |=Fu(Ci→ j(ϕ1∧ϕ2))→
Ki(Fu(Ci→ jϕ1)) iff F is ES.
Proof. Based on Postulate P13, Fu(Ci→ j(ϕ1∧ϕ2))→ Fu(Ci→ jϕ1). So, it is enough
to prove (M ,s1) |= Fu(Ci→ jϕ1)→ Ki(Fu(Ci→ jϕ1)) which was proved in P4.
Discussion: This postulate reflects the fact that if an agent fulfilled a conjunction,
then it would be aware of its own fulfillment of each part of the conjunction.
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P15. [Strong consistency]
Formalization: Ci→ jϕ →¬Ci→ j¬ϕ .
Meaning: If commitment is satisfied, then committing to the negation of its content
never satisfied.
Correspondence: For any frame F = (W,≈i,≈ j,≈i→ j), F |=Ci→ jϕ →¬Ci→ j¬ϕ
iff F is serial with respect to ≈i→ j.
Proof. (⇐) Suppose that F = (W,≈i,≈ j,≈i→ j) is serial with respect to ≈i→ j, and
let M = (W,≈i,≈ j,≈i→ j,V ) be any model based on F . Given s1 ∈W , we must
show (M ,s1) |=Ci→ jϕ →¬Ci→ j¬ϕ . Assume that (M ,s1) |= (Ci→ jϕ)∧ (Ci→ j¬ϕ).
From the semantics of Ci→ jϕ , for all global states s2 ∈ S such that s1 ≈i→ j s2, we
have (M ,s2) |= Kiϕ ∧Ki¬ϕ . Thus, from the semantics of Kiϕ , for all s3 ∈ S such
that s2 ≈i s3, we have (M ,s3) |= ϕ ∧¬ϕ . Therefore, the contradiction.
(⇒) Suppose that F is not serial with respect to≈i→ j. We must show F 2Ci→ jϕ →
¬Ci→ j¬ϕ . Since F is not serial, using an argument by contraposition, then it might
be the case that (M ,s1) |=Ci→ jp∧Ci→ j¬p. Therefore, F 2Ci→ jp→¬Ci→ j¬p, as
desired.
Discussion: The validity of this postulate is captured from the fact that an agent can-
not commit to bring about ϕ and ¬ϕ at the same time. This postulate is incorporated
in [88, 32].
P16. [Knowing strong consistency]
Formalization: Ci→ jϕ → Ki(¬Ci→ j¬ϕ).
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Meaning: When a commitment holds, then the debtor knows that there is no possi-
bility to commit about the the negation of the commitment content.
Correspondence: For any frame F = (W,≈i,≈ j,≈i→ j),
F |=Ci→ jϕ → Ki(¬Ci→ j¬ϕ) iff F is ES.
Proof. Based on Postulate P15, (M ,s1) |=Ci→ jϕ →¬Ci→ j¬ϕ . Consequently, it is
enough to prove that (M ,s1) |= ¬Ci→ j¬ϕ → Ki(¬Ci→ j¬ϕ) which is similar to the
proof of P6.
Discussion: This postulate is reasonable to be applied in open MASs since it does
not make sense for an agent to commit and reason about ϕ and ¬ϕ at the same time.
P17. [Nonexistence]
Formalization: AG ¬ϕ →¬Ci→ jϕ .
Meaning: If the content of the commitment does not hold globally, then the commit-
ment itself does not hold too.
Correspondence: For any frame F = (W,≈i,≈ j,≈i→ j), F |= AG ¬ϕ → ¬Ci→ jϕ
iff F is serial with respect to ≈i→ j.
Proof. (⇐) Suppose that F = (W,≈i,≈ j,≈i→ j) is serial with respect to ≈i→ j and
let M = (W,≈i,≈ j,≈i→ j,V ) be any model based on F . Given s1 ∈W , we must
show (M ,s1) |= AG ¬ϕ →¬Ci→ jϕ . Assume that (M ,s1) |= AG ¬ϕ ∧Ci→ jϕ . From
the semantics of Ci→ jϕ , for all global states s2 ∈ S such that s1 ≈i→ j s2, we have
(M ,s2) |= Kiϕ ∧K jϕ . Further, from the semantics of Kiϕ and AGϕ , for all s3 ∈ S
such that s2 ≈i s3, we have (M ,s3) |= ϕ ∧¬ϕ . So, the contradiction.
78
(⇒) We argue by contraposition. Suppose that F is not serial with respect to ≈i→ j.
We must show F 2 AG ¬ϕ → ¬Ci→ jϕ . Since F is not serial, then it might be
the case that (M ,s1) |= AG ¬p∧Ci→ jp. Therefore, F 2 AG ¬p → ¬Ci→ jp, as
desired.
Discussion: This postulate illustrates the fact that, if the content of the commitment
(i.e., ϕ) does not hold in all global states, then the commitment itself never holds.
This seems reasonable since, from the semantics of the commitment, both agents
(i.e., debtor and creditor) become aware of the content in the accessible states which
are also reachable. This postulates is incorporated in [32].
P18. [Knowing the nonexistence]
Formalization: AG ¬ϕ → Ki¬(Ci→ jϕ).
Meaning: An agent knows that it is not the case that it commits to a content which
never holds.
Correspondence: For any frameF =(W,≈i,≈ j,≈i→ j),F |=AG¬ϕ →Ki¬(Ci→ jϕ)
iff F is ES.
Proof. From Postulate P17, (M ,s1) |= AG¬ϕ →¬Ci→ jϕ . So, it is enough to prove
(M ,s1) |= ¬Ci→ jϕ → Ki¬(Ci→ jϕ) which has similar proof as P6.
Discussion: This postulate is reasonable to be applied in open MASs since agents




Meaning: Commuting to false never holds.
Correspondence: For any frame F = (W,≈i,≈ j,≈i→ j), F |= ¬Ci→ j⊥ iff F is
serial with respect to ≈i→ j.
Proof. (⇐) Suppose that F = (W,≈i,≈ j,≈i→ j) is serial with respect to ≈i→ j and
let M = (W,≈i,≈ j,≈i→ j,V ) be any model based on F . Given s1 ∈W , we must
show (M ,s1) |= ¬Ci→ j⊥. Assume that (M ,s1) |= Ci→ j⊥. From the semantics of
commitment, for all global states s2 ∈ S such that s1 ≈i→ j s2, we have (M ,s2) |=
Ki⊥∧K j⊥ which contradicts the consistency axiom of knowledge (i.e., Axiom D ).
Therefore, (M ,s1) |= ¬Ci→ j⊥.
(⇒) Suppose that F is not serial with respect to≈i→ j. We must show F 2 ¬Ci→ j⊥.
Since F is not serial, then it might be the case that (M ,s1) |= Ci→ j⊥. Therefore,
F 2 ¬Ci→ j⊥, as desired.
Discussion: The validity of this postulate is captured from the fact that an agent
cannot know false [43]. Consequently, similar to knowledge, an agent cannot commit
to false. This postulate is integrated in [88, 32, 21].
P20. [Knowing committing to false]
Formalization: ¬Ki(Ci→ j⊥).
Meaning: Committing to false cannot be known.
Correspondence: For any frame F = (W,≈i,≈ j,≈i→ j), F |= ¬Ki(Ci→ j⊥) iff F is
serial with respect to ≈i.
Proof. (⇐) Suppose that F = (W,≈i,≈ j,≈i→ j) is serial with respect to ≈i. Let
M = (W,≈i,≈ j,≈i→ j,V ) be any model based on F . Given s1 ∈W , we must show
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(M ,s1) |= ¬Ki(Ci→ j⊥). Assume that (M ,s1) |= Ki(Ci→ j⊥). From the semantics of
knowledge, for all global states s2 ∈ S such that s1 ≈i s2, we have (M ,s2) |=Ci→ j⊥
which is a contradiction with Postulate P19. Therefore, (M ,s1) |= ¬Ki(Ci→ j⊥).
(⇒) Suppose thatF is not serial with respect to≈i. Wemust showF 2¬Ki(Ci→ j⊥).
Since F is not serial, then it might be the case that (M ,s1) |=Ki(Ci→ j⊥). Therefore,
F 2 ¬Ki(Ci→ j⊥), as desired.
Discussion: This postulate is reasonable to be applied in open MASs since it reflects
the fact that an agent cannot know an impossible commitment. Again, the validity of




Meaning: Agent i cannot fulfill a non existing commitment.
Proof. Given s1 ∈W , we must show (M ,s1) |=¬Fu(Ci→ j⊥). Assume that (M ,s1) |=
Fu(Ci→ j⊥). According to Postulate P2, (M ,s1) |= Ki⊥ which contradicts the D ax-
iom of knowledge. Thus, (M ,s1) |= ¬Fu(Ci→ j⊥).
Discussion: This postulate says that a non existing commitment cannot be fulfilled.
It is reasonable to be applied in open MASs as agents cannot fulfill an impossible
commitment. This postulate is incorporated in [32].
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P22. [Debtors’ knowledge of fulfilling an impossible commitment]
Formalization: ¬Ki(Fu(Ci→ j⊥)).
Meaning: Fulfillment for committing to false cannot be known by the debtor.
Correspondence: For any frame F = (W,≈i,≈ j,≈i→ j), F |= ¬Ki(Fu(Ci→ j⊥)) iff
F is serial with respect to ≈i.
Proof. (⇐) Suppose that F = (W,≈i,≈ j,≈i→ j) is serial with respect to ≈i. Let
M = (W,≈i,≈ j,≈i→ j,V ) be any model based on F . Given s1 ∈W , we must show
(M ,s1) |= ¬Ki(Fu(Ci→ j⊥)). Assume (M ,s1) |= Ki(Fu(Ci→ j⊥)). From the seman-
tics of knowledge, for all global states s2 ∈ S such that s1 ≈i s2 we have (M ,s2) |=
Fu(Ci→ j⊥) which is a contradiction with P21. Thus, (M ,s1) |= ¬Ki(Fu(Ci→ j⊥)).
(⇒) Suppose that F is not serial with respect to ≈i. We must show that
F 2 ¬Ki(Fu(Ci→ j⊥)). We argue by contraposition. Since F is not serial, then it
might be the case that (M ,s1) |=Ki(Fu(Ci→ j⊥)). Therefore, F 2¬Ki(Fu(Ci→ j⊥)),
as desired.
Discussion: This postulate is reasonable to be applied in MASs as debtor cannot
know a fulfillment for a non existing commitment.
P23. [Creditors’ knowledge of fulfilling an impossible commitment]
Formalization: ¬K j(Fu(Ci→ j⊥)).
Meaning: Fulfillment for committing to false cannot be known by the creditor.
Correspondence: For any frame F = (W,≈i,≈ j,≈i→ j), F |= ¬K j(Fu(Ci→ j⊥)) iff
F is serial with respect to ≈ j.
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Proof. The proof is similar to the previous one, but with respect j.
Discussion: Similar to Postulate P22, the creditor cannot know a fulfillment to a non
existing commitment.
4.2.2 Soundness and Completeness
Soundness and completeness of a “deduction system” illustrate its appropriateness for han-
dling logic [96]. A logic is called sound, “whenever its decision problem is solved for a
given set of formulae, then this formula set has a special semantic property” [96]. On the
other hand, completeness of a deductive logic means that “if a set of formulae has the se-
mantic property given by soundness, then the calculus works successfully over that set of
formulas" [96].
As mentioned by [88], the existence of the correspondence between a given set of
postulates and their related classes of frames provides the soundness and completeness for
the logic under consideration. Thus, the Theorem below results directly from the proofs
given in the aforementioned postulates.
Theorem 4.1. The logic consists of any subset of the postulates {P1−P23} is sound and
complete with regard to the models that are based on the corresponding classes of frames.
By proving the soundness and completeness of CTLKC+, we answer the fifth research
question [Q5].
4.3 Summary
In this chapter, we proved the soundness and completeness of CTLKC+ using Benthem’s
correspondence theory for modal logic. The main insightful and practical implication of this
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chapter is that the combined CTLKC+ logic is proven as a consistent, robust and powerful
logical tool to model complex but realistic MASs where agents have knowledge and able
to manipulate and reason about commitments. This will leverage the use of this logic in
practice particularly because it is more expressive than the logics of knowledge and the
logics of commitments taken separately.
In the next chapter, we will address the problem of model checking CTLKC+. Then,
we will compute the time and space complexity of the proposed model checking algorithms.
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Chapter 5
Model Checking Temporal Knowledge
and Social Commitments in MASs
In this chapter1, we address the problem of model checking CTLKC+ by transforming it to
the problem of model checking GCTL∗ [14] and ARCTL [75] in order to respectively use
the CWB-NC automata-based model checker and the extended NuSMV symbolic model
checker. We also prove that the transformation (reduction) techniques are sound. After
that, we analyze the space and time complexity of the proposed model checking techniques.
The results of this analysis reveal that the space complexity of our procedures is PSPACE-
complete for local concurrent programs with respect to the size of these programs and the
length of the formula being checked. Finally, we implement our model checking procedures
on top of the extended NuSMV and CWB-NC model checkers and report some verification
results.
1The results of this chapter are published in [3] and [2].
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5.1 Introduction
Multi-Agent Systems (MASs) have noticed an increase in their use in numerous real world
applications since their emergence. They have been extensively and successfully used in
a variety of industrial, commercial, governmental, military, and entertainment applications
[70, 98, 56]. Such systems have long been under focus by researchers to develop systematic
techniques to model them and ensure their compliance against their specifications. In fact,
various approaches have been carried out to model and represent MASs. Kripke structures
[57] and interpreted systems [43] are the most prominent frameworks for this purpose.
These underlying models are used to traditionally interpret some logics that are used to
specify and reason about desirable properties of MASs.
In this chapter, we exploit model checking paradigm to formally model and auto-
matically verify MASs with respect to certain properties related to agents knowledge and
their commitments in the system. In Chapter 3, we studied the interactions between knowl-
edge and social commitments in MASs from formal semantics perspective. Concretely, we
introduced the CTLKC+ logic, an extension of CTL [41] with modalities for knowledge
and commitments. This logic has the ability to express and reason not only about knowl-
edge and social commitments independently, but also about formulas combining the two
modalities. Moreover, we develop, a new version of interpreted systems, originally intro-
duced in [43], as the formal model of CTLKC+ over which formulas can be interpreted.
This extension allows us to model agents as well as their interactions. The developed ap-
proach proposes a new definition of the social accessibility relation needed for commit-
ments, which was introduced in [7, 36] in such a way that it does not include the epistemic
accessibility for knowledge in any way, yet keeping the intuition of having communication
channels between interacting components. This new definition makes the logic consistent
when it comes to express relationships between knowledge and commitments. After that,
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in Chapter 4, we proved the soundness and completeness of the CTLKC+ logic using cor-
respondence theory for modal logic [92].
In this chapter, we aim to investigate the relationship between knowledge and social
commitments from model checking and complexity perspectives. To do so, we first use a
direct and intuitive reduction technique of the model checking problem of CTLKC+ logic
into the problem of model checking an action logic called GCTL∗ [14] that extends branch-
ing temporal logic. The technique is direct in the sense that GCTL∗ models include general
action transitions that are directly mapped to the accessibility relations. Consequently, we
are able to use the automata-based model checker CWB-NC as verification tool. After that,
we develop a symbolic model checking approach by transforming the problem of model
checking CTLKC+ into the problem of model checking ARCTL [75], that extends the
branching time logic CTL with actions. Thus, we are able to benefit from the extended
NuSMV symbolic model checker as verification tool.
Figure 5.1 illustrates the overall approach, which consists of four phases. In the first
phase, we recall the CTLKC+ logic which was introduced in Chapter 3. In the second
phase, we introduce our formal verification techniques based on transforming the problem
of model checking CTLKC+ into the problem of model checking GCTL∗ [14] and ARCTL
[75]. In the third phase, we analyze the complexity of our transformation-based procedures
of model checking CTLKC+. To check the effectiveness of the proposed approach, in the
fourth phase we implement our reduction techniques on top of the CWB-NC and extended
NuSMV model checkers and report the verification results of verifying the NetBill protocol
[90] against some desirable properties expressed in our logic.
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Figure 5.1: A schematic view of the proposed approach
automata-based model checking of CTLKC+. In Section 5.3, we introduce the symbolic-
based model checking of CTLKC+. In Section 5.4, we compute the computational com-
plexity of our transformation-based model checking techniques. We discuss the implemen-
tation of the proposed techniques and report the verification results in Section 5.5. Finally,
we conclude the chapter in Section 5.6.
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5.2 Model Checking CTLKC+ using Transformation to
GCTL∗
In this section, we introduce a new technique to model check CTLKC+ (Phase 2 of Figure
5.1). In a nutshell, the technical formulation of the CTLKC+ model checking problem is
as follows: Given a MAS represented as an interpreted systems model M and a formula ϕ
in CTLKC+ describing a property, the problem can be defined as verifying whether or not
M  ϕ .
Model checking the CTLKC+ logic can be carried out in two ways:
• A direct method by either developing a proper model checker from scratch or extend-
ing an existing model checker with new algorithms for the needed modalities as in
[7, 39, 62, 40].
• By a formal reduction (transformation) method into an existing model checker as
in [13, 61, 36, 97]. In this chapter, we follow this approach by transforming the
problem of model checking CTLKC+ into the problem of model checking GCTL∗ (a
generalized version of CTL∗ with action formulas) [14] and ARCTL (an extension of
CTL with action formulas) [75].
5.2.1 Transformation Procedure
In this section, we will show how our CTLKC+ logic can be model checked by formally
transforming the problem of model checking CTLKC+ into the problem of model checking
an existing logic called Generalized CTL∗ (or simply GCTL∗) [14]. We first review GCTL∗
that extends CTL∗ by allowing formulas to constrain not only states, but also actions. We
then present the transformation (also called reduction) procedure of the model checking
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problem. The following BNF grammar defines the syntax of GCTL∗ as proposed in [14]:
S ::= p | ¬S | S∨S | E P
P ::= θ | ¬P | S | P∨P | X P | PU P
where p is an atomic proposition from the set Φp and θ is an atomic action proposition
from the set Φa. Two types of formulas are distinguished: (1) state formulas S that hold
on a given state; and (2) path formulas P that express temporal properties of paths. State
formulas are the legal GCTL∗ formulas. The model of GCTL∗ is defined as follows.
Definition 5.1 (Model of GCTL∗). A model MGC = (SGC,Acc, lSC, lAcc,Tr, IGC) is a tuple
where SGC is a set of global states; Acc is a set of actions; lSC : SGC→ 2
Φp is a state labeling
function; lAcc : Acc→ 2
Φa is an action labeling function; Tr ⊆ SGC×Acc×SGC is a labeled
transition relation; and IGC ⊆ SGC is a set of initial states.
Intuitively, SGC contains the reachable states of the system, and Acc are the possible actions
for the system. The label function lSC indicates which atomic proposition is satisfied on
a given state where the function lAcc indicates which atomic action is satisfied on a given
state.
The GCTL∗ semantics as a temporal logic is given as follows [14]. A state satisfies
Aϕ “if every path starting from the state satisfies ϕ”. On the other hand, a state satisfies
Eϕ “if some paths starting from the state satisfies ϕ”. A path satisfies a state formula if its
initial state does, and a path satisfies θ if the label of the first transition on this path satisfies
θ . The time operators X andU are as usual.
Our transformation procedure from the problem of model checking CTLKC+ to the
problem of model checking GCTL∗ is defined as follows: given a CTLKC+ model M =
(S, I,Rt ,{≈i |i ∈ A },{≈i→ j |(i, j) ∈A
2},V ), we need to define a GCTL∗ model MGC =
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F (M). Further, given a CTLKC+ formula ϕ , we need to define a GCTL∗ formula F (ϕ)
using a transformation functionF such thatM |=ϕ iffF (M) |=F (ϕ). The modelF (M)
is defined as a GCTL∗ model MGC(SGC,Acc, lSC, lAcc,Tr, IGC) as follows:
• SGC = S;
• IGC = I;
• lSC = V ;
• To define the set of actions (Acc), let us first define the set Φa of atomic action
propositions from three types of actions: one for the social accessibility relation
≈i→ j to capture the semantics of commitment; one for the epistemic accessibility
relation ≈i to capture the semantics of knowledge, and one from the symmetric
closure of the social accessibility relation ≈i→ j to capture the semantics of fulfill-
ment. Φa = {ε,α1→1,α1→2, . . . ,αn→n} ∪ {β1,β2, . . . ,βn} ∪ {γ1→1,γ1→2, . . . ,γn→n},
then Acc = {αo,α11,α12, . . . ,αnn} ∪ {β 1, β 2, . . . ,β n} ∪ {γ11, γ12, . . . ,γnn} where
αo is the action labeling transition defined from the transition relation (Tr) and α
i j
is the action labeling transition defined from the social accessibility relation ≈i→ j,
β i is the action labeling the transition obtained from the epistemic accessibility re-
lation ≈i, and γ
i j is the action labeling the symmetric transition added when there
exists a transition labeled with α i j and needed to define transformation of the for-
mula Fu(Ci→ jϕ);
• The function lAcc is defined as follows:
1. If αo ∈ Acc, then lAcc(α
o) = {ε},
2. lAcc(α
i j) = {αi→ j} for 1≤ i≤ n and 1≤ j ≤ n,
3. lAcc(β
i) = {βi} for 1≤ i≤ n,
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4. lAcc(γ
i j) = {γi→ j} for 1≤ i≤ n and 1≤ j ≤ n; and
• The labeled transition relation Tr combines the temporal labeled transition Rt , the ac-
cessibility relations≈i→ j and≈i, and the symmetric closure of the social accessibility
relation ≈i→ j as follows:
1. (s,αo,s′) ∈ Tr if (s,s
′) ∈ Rt ,
2. (s,α i j,s′) ∈ Tr if s≈i→ j s
′,
3. (s,β i,s′) ∈ Tr if s≈i s
′,
4. (s,γ i j,s′) ∈ Tr if (s
′,α i j,s) ∈ Tr.
Let us now define F (ϕ) as a GCTL∗ formula by induction on the form of the CTLKC+
formula ϕ .
• F (p)=p, if p ∈Φp;
• F (¬ϕ) = ¬F (ϕ);
• F (ϕ ∨ψ) = F (ϕ)∨F (ψ);
• F (EXϕ) = EXF (ϕ);
• F (E(ϕ U ψ)) = E(F (ϕ)U F (ψ));
• F (EGϕ) = EGF (ϕ);
• F (Kiϕ) = A(βi∧XF (ϕ));
• F (Ci→ jϕ) = A(αi→ j∧XF (Kiϕ ∧K jϕ));
• F (Fu(Ci→ jϕ)) = E(γi→ j∧XF (Ci→ jϕ)) ∨
E(βi∧XF (Fu(Ci→ jϕ))) ∨
E(β j∧XF (Fu(Ci→ jϕ))).
Theorem 5.1 (Soundness of F ). Let M and ϕ be respectively a CTLKC+ model and for-
mula and let F (M) and F (ϕ) be the corresponding model and formula in GCTL∗. We
haveM |= ϕ iff F (M) |= F (ϕ).
Proof. We prove this theorem by induction on the structure of the formula ϕ . All the cases
are straightforward, except the following three cases:
• ϕ = Kiψ . We have (M,s) |= Kiψ iff (M,s
′) |= ψ for every s′ ∈ S such that s ≈i s
′.
Consequently, (M,s) |= Kiψ iff (F (M),s
′) |= F (ψ) for every s′ ∈ SGC such that
(s,β i,s′) ∈ Tr. By semantics of A and X , we obtain (F (M),s) |= A(βi∧XF (ψ).
• ϕ =Ci→ jψ . We have (M,s) |=Ci→ jψ iff (M,s
′) |= Kiψ ∧K jψ for every s
′ ∈ S such
that s ≈i→ j s
′. Consequently, (M,s) |=Ci→ jψ iff (F (M),s
′) |= F (Kiψ ∧K jψ) for
every s′ ∈ SGC such that (s,α
i j,s′) ∈ Tr. By the semantics of A and X , we obtain
(F (M),s) |= A(αi→ j∧XF (Kiψ ∧K jψ)).
• ϕ = Fu(Ci→ jψ). We have (M,s) |= Fu(Ci→ jψ) iff (1) (M,s1) |=Ci→ jψ for a state
s1 ∈ S such that s1 ≈i→ j s; or (2) (M,s2) |= Fu(Ci→ jψ) for a state s2 ∈ S such that
s2 ≈i s; or (3) (M,s3) |= Fu(Ci→ jψ) for a state s3 ∈ S such that s3 ≈ j s.
Consequently, (M,s) |= Fu(Ci→ jψ) iff (1) (F (M),s1) |= F (Ci→ jψ) for s1 ∈ SGC
such that (s,γ i j,s1)∈ Tr; or (2) (F (M),s2) |=F (Fu(Ci→ jψ)) for s2 ∈ SGC such that
(s2,β
i,s)∈ Tr; or (3) (F (M),s3) |=F (Fu(Ci→ jψ)) for s3 ∈ SGC such that (s3,β
j,s)
∈Tr. Using the semantics of E and X , we obtain: (F (M),s) |=E(γi→ j∧XF (Ci→ jϕ))
∨ E(βi∧XF (Fu(Ci→ jϕ))) ∨ E(β j∧XF (Fu(Ci→ jϕ))).
Therefore, the theorem.
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5.3 Model Checking CTLKC+ using Transformation to
ARCTL
5.3.1 Transformation Procedure
In this section, we briefly review ARCTL logic [75]. Then, we show how the problem
of model checking CTLKC+ can be reduced to the problem of model checking ARCTL.
The main advantage of using this reduction is to benefit from the efficient model checking
procedure already integrated in the extended NuSMV model checker [22]. Figure 5.2 de-
picts the workflow of such a reduction technique which consists of the following processes.
First, we transform our modelM into an ARCTL model, which is automatically translated
into an extended NuSMV model. Second, we transform CTLKC+ formulas into ARCTL
formulas. Finally, both ARCTL formulas and the obtained extended NuSMV model will
be the input of the extended NuSMV model checker to obtain our verification results. This
approach is carried out automatically using a JAVA transformation tool. More details about















Figure 5.2: Reduction technique workflow
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The syntax of ARCTL, as proposed in [75], is defined by the following BNF gram-
mar:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ϕ | EαXϕ | Eα(ϕ U ϕ) | EαGϕ
α ::= b | ¬α | α ∨ α
where p ∈Φp, ϕ is a state formula, α is an action formula, and b ∈Φa is an atomic action
proposition.
Definition 5.2 (Model of ARCTL). A model MAR = (SAR, IAR,ACAR,TAR,VSAR,VAAR) is a
tuple where SAR is a set of global states; IAR ⊆ SAR is a set of initial states; ACAR is a set
of actions; TAR ⊆ SAR×ACAR×SAR is a labeled transition relation; VSAR : SAR → 2
Φp is an
interpretation for atomic propositions; VAAR : ACAR → 2
Φa is an interpretation for atomic
action propositions.
To define the semantics of ARCTL [75], we need to define the α-restriction of MAR




AR is a transition relation such
that (s,a,s′) ∈ TαAR iff (s,a,s
′) ∈ TAR and a |= α wherein |= is defined as follows:
• a |= b iff b ∈VAAR(a);
• a |= ¬α iff not (a |= α) and;
• a |= α ∨α ′ iff a |= α or a |= α ′.
The α-restriction motivates us to concentrate each time on specific transitions whose
labels hold on a given action formula. Consequently, when we want to verify a formula,
we consider the relevant transitions only. In this perspective, Πα(s) defines the set of paths
whose actions satisfy an action formula α which starts at state s.
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By omitting the semantics of Boolean connectives and propositional atoms, the satis-
faction relation (MαAR,s) |= ϕ is given as follows [75]:
• (MαAR,s) |= EαXϕ iff ∃ pi ∈Π
α(s) and pi(1) |= ϕ ,
• (MαAR,s) |= Eα(ϕ U ψ) iff ∃ pi ∈Π
α(s) s.t. for some k ≥ 0,pi(k) |= ψ and pi( j) |= ϕ
for all 0≤ j < k,
• (MαAR,s) |= EαGϕ iff ∃ pi ∈Π
α(s) such that pi(k) |= ϕ for all k ≥ 0.
We define the reduction process as follows: given a CTLKC+ modelM=(S, I,Rt ,{≈i
|i ∈ A},{≈i→ j |(i, j) ∈A
2},V ) and a CTLKC+ formula ϕ , we need to define an α-
restricted ARCTL model MαAR =H (M) and an ARCTL formula ϕ =H (ϕ) using a trans-
formation function H such thatM |= ϕ iff H (M) |= H (ϕ).




• SAR = S;
• IAR = I;
• VSAR = V ;
• We define the set of atomic action propositions Φa as follows. Each relation in M
is translated into a labeled transition in the transformed model H (M) (i.e., MαAR).
So doing provides us with four types of actions: one for the transition relation which
already exists in the model; one for the social accessibility relation ≈i→ j to cap-
ture the semantics of commitment; one for the epistemic accessibility relation ≈i
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to capture the semantics of knowledge; the last one from the symmetric closure of
the social accessibility relation ≈i→ j to capture the semantics of fulfillment. Thus,
Φa = {ε,α1→1,α1→2, . . . ,αn→n}∪{β1,β2, . . . ,βn}∪{γ1→1,γ1→2, . . . ,γn→n}. Conse-
quently, the set ACAR of actions is defined as follows: ACAR= {α
o,α11,α12, . . . ,αnn}∪
{β 1, β 2, . . . ,β n}∪{γ11, γ12, . . . ,γnn} where αo is the action labeling transition de-
fined from the transition relation Rt . α
i j is the action labeling transition defined the
social accessibility relation ≈i→ j, β
i is the action labeling the transition obtained
from the epistemic accessibility relation ≈i, and γ
i j is the action labeling the sym-
metric transition added when there exists a transition labeled with α i j and needed to
define transformation of the formula Fu(Ci→ jϕ);
• The function VAAR is defined as follows:
1. If αo ∈ ACAR, then VAAR(α
o) = {ε},
2. VAAR(α
i j) = {αi→ j} for 1≤ i≤ n and 1≤ j ≤ n,
3. VAAR(β
i) = {βi} for 1≤ i≤ n,
4. VAAR(γ
i j) = {γi→ j} for 1≤ i≤ n and 1≤ j ≤ n.
• The labeled transition relation TαAR merges the temporal labeled transition Rt , the ac-
cessibility relations≈i→ j and≈i, and the symmetric closure of the social accessibility
relation ≈i→ j as follows,
1. (s,αo,s′) ∈ T εAR if (s,s
′) ∈ Rt ;
2. (s,α i j,s′) ∈ T
αi→ j
AR if s≈i→ j s
′;
3. (s,β i,s′) ∈ T
βi
AR if s≈i s
′; and
4. (s,γ i j,s′) ∈ T
γi→ j
AR if (s
′,α i j,s) ∈ T
αi→ j
AR .
Hereafter, let us define H (ϕ) by induction on the form of the CTLKC+ formula ϕ .
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1. H (p) = p, if p ∈Φp;
2. H (¬ϕ) = ¬H (ϕ);
3. H (ϕ ∨ψ) = H (ϕ)∨H (ψ);
4. H (EXϕ) = Eε(XH (ϕ));
5. H (E(ϕ U ψ)) = Eε(H (ϕ)U H (ψ));
6. H (EGϕ) = Eε(GH (ϕ));
7. H (Kiϕ) = Aβi(XH (ϕ));
8. H (Ci→ jϕ) = Aαi→ j(XH (Kiϕ ∧K jϕ));
9. H (Fu(Ci→ jϕ)) = Eγi→ j(XH (Ci→ jϕ)) ∨
Eβi(XH (Eγi→ j(XH (Ci→ jϕ)))) ∨
Eβ j(XH (Eγi→ j(XH (Ci→ jϕ)))).
Therefore, we can verify CTLKC+ formulas by verifying their transformed form in
ARCTL using the extended NuSMV tool [61]. Figure 5.3 depicts an example illustrating
the transformation function H .
In this figure, the CTLKC+ model M, on the left side of the figure, will be trans-
formed into the ARCTL model MαAR, on the right side of the figure. In fact, the model
M consists of two global states s0 and s1. The state s1 is socially accessible from the
state s0 (i.e., s0 ≈i→ j s1). Furthermore, the state formulas Kiϕ and K jϕ hold on s1 (i.e.,
(M,s1) |=Kiϕ , (M,s1) |=K jϕ). Thus, according to the semantics, (M,s0) |=Ci→ jϕ . Since
the commitment modality holds on s0 (i.e., (M,s0) |=Ci→ jϕ) and s1 is socially accessible
from s0 (i.e., s0≈i→ j s1) then, according to the semantics, the fulfillment modality will hold
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Figure 5.3: Example of the transformation function H
the state s0 (i.e., s0 ≈i s1) and ϕ holds on both s0 and s1. Consequently, (M,s0) |= Kiϕ .
Using the transformation technique described above, the modelM will be transformed into
the ARCTL model MαAR as follows. The transition relation (i.e., (s0,s1)∈ Rt) is transformed
into a labeled transition (s0,α
o,s1). Furthermore, the social accessibility relation (≈i→ j)
between the states s0 and s1 is transformed into a labeled transition (s0,α
i j,s1). Moreover,
the epistemic accessibility relation (≈i) between the states s0 and s1 is transformed into
a labeled transition (s0,β
i,s1). The symmetric closure of the social accessibility relation
(≈i→ j) between the states s0 and s1 is transformed into a labeled transition (s1,γ
i j,s0). Fi-
nally, each state formula in CTLKC+ will be transformed into ARCTL formula using the
transformation function H . In fact, the formulas ϕ ,Ci→ jϕ , Fu(Ci→ jϕ), Kiϕ and K jϕ will
be transformed into H (ϕ), H (Ci→ jϕ), H (Fu(Ci→ jϕ)), H (Kiϕ) and H (K jϕ) respec-
tively.
The following theorem proves the soundness of our reduction from CTLKC+ to ARCTL.
Theorem 5.2 (Soundness of H ). Let M and ϕ be respectively a CTLKC+ model and
formula and let H (M) and H (ϕ) be the corresponding model and formula in ARCTL.
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We haveM |= ϕ iff H (M) |= H (ϕ).
Proof. We prove this theorem by induction on the structure of the formula ϕ . All the cases
are straightforward, except the following three cases:
• ϕ = Kiψ . We have (M,s) |= Kiψ iff (M,s
′) |= ψ for every s′ ∈ S such that s ≈i s
′.
Consequently, (M,s) |= Kiψ iff (H (M),s
′) |= H (ψ) for every s′ ∈ SAR such that
(s,β i,s′) ∈ T
β i
AR. By semantics of A and X , we obtain (H (M),s) |= Aβi(XH (ψ)).
• ϕ =Ci→ jψ . We have (M,s) |=Ci→ jψ iff (M,s
′) |= Kiψ ∧K jψ for every s
′ ∈ S such
that s ≈i→ j s
′. Consequently, (M,s) |= Ci→ jψ iff (H (M),s
′) |= H (Kiψ ∧K jψ)
for every s′ ∈ SAR such that (s,α
i j,s′) ∈ T
αi→ j
AR . By semantics of A and X , we obtain
(H (M),s) |= Aαi→ j(XH (Kiψ ∧K jψ).
• ϕ = Fu(Ci→ jψ). We have (M,s) |= Fu(Ci→ jψ) iff (1) (M,s1) |=Ci→ jψ for a state
s1 ∈ S such that s1 ≈i→ j s; or (2) (M,s2) |= Fu(Ci→ jψ) for a state s2 ∈ S such that
s2 ≈i s; or (3) (M,s3) |= Fu(Ci→ jψ) for a state s3 ∈ S such that s3 ≈ j s.
Consequently, (M,s) |= Fu(Ci→ jψ) iff (1) (H (M),s1) |= H (Ci→ jψ) for s1 ∈ SAR
such that (s,γ i j,s1)∈ T
αi→ j








AR. Using the semantics of E and X , we obtain: (H (M),s) |=
Eγi→ j(XH (Ci→ jψ)) ∨Eβi(XH (Fu(Ci→ jψ))) ∨Eβ j(XH (Fu(Ci→ jψ))).
Therefore, the theorem.
By developing the reduction-approaches in Sections 5.2 and 5.3, we are answering
the sixth research question [Q6].
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5.4 Complexity Analysis
In this section, we will first analyze the time complexity of model checking CTLKC+ with
regard to the size of the explicit model M and length of the formula to be checked. There-
after, we will analyze the space complexity of model checking CTLKC+ for concurrent
programs with respect to the size of the components of these programs and length of the
formula (Phase 3 of Figure 5.1).
5.4.1 Time Complexity
In this subsection, we will prove that model checking CTLKC+ is P-complete, so it can be
done in polynomial running time in the size of the model and length of the formula.
Theorem 5.3. The time complexity for model checking CTLKC+ is O(|M| × |ψ|) where
|M| is the size of the model and |ψ| is the length of the formula.
Proof. CTLKC+ extends CTL with modalities for knowledge, commitments and fulfill-
ment. Further, in [23] Clarke proved that the problem of model checking CTL is linear in
the size of the model and the length of the formula, which gives us the lower bound. We
just need to analyze the time complexity of the reduction procedure presented in Section
5.3. In this procedure, it is easy to show that reducing CTLKC+ model M into ARCTL
model MαAR can be done in linear running time in the size of the model, as procedure steps
are simply performing transformation operations on states and transitions. For transforming
CTLKC+ formula into ARCTL formula, this can be shown as follows. First, it is known
form [91] that the reachability test between two global states s and s′, s.t. (s,s′) ∈ Rt , can
be done in linear time. Moreover, Step 7 in defining H (ϕ) calls the procedure recursively
on the subformula ϕ of the formula ψ = Kiϕ . Further, step 8 calls the procedure recur-
sively on the subformulas Kiϕ and K jϕ of the formula ψ = Ci→ jϕ . Finally, step 9 calls
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the procedure recursively on the subformula Ci→ jϕ of the formula ψ = Fu(Ci→ jϕ). The
procedure is recursively called until a CTL subformula is reached. Consequently, the depth
of the recursion is limited to the length of the formulas ψ which is linear. Therefore, we
conclude that the complexity of the proposed transformation procedure is linear in both the
size of the model |M| and the length of the formula |ψ|.
Theorem 5.4. The model checking problem for CTLKC+ is P-complete.
Proof. Membership in P (i.e., upper bound) follows from Theorem 5.3.
Hardness in P (i.e., lower bound) follows by a reduction from model checking CTL proved
to be P-complete in [82].
5.4.2 Space Complexity
The methodology of analyzing the space complexity of our reduction technique is as fol-
lows. We first analyze the computational complexity of model checking ARCTL in con-
current programs and show that our reduction procedure is polynomial with respect to the
size of those programs. Consequently, the proposed verification technique has the same
complexity as the one of model checking the original logic, namely ARCTL in concur-
rent programs. In the rest of the chapter, log denotes log-space reduction and p denotes
polynomial-space reduction. Moreover, let Mod(L) be the model of a logical language L
andCon(L) the concurrent program model of the language L.
Lemma 5.1. Model checking ARCTL for concurrent programs is PSPACE-hard with re-
spect to the size of the local processes of these programs and the length of the formula
being checked.
Proof. ARCTL is an extension of CTL. In fact, any model of CTL can be translated to a
model of ARCTL by simply labeling the transitions by ε , the empty action symbol and
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specify the interpretation of atomic actions by associating to ε an empty atomic action
formula, which always holds for any action a. Hence, we can imagine a deterministic
Turing machine that looks at the input CTL model and writes in its output tape, one by
one, the same states and transitions, where each transition will be labeled by ε . Thus, the
Turing machine can compute this reduction in space O(logn) where n is the size of the
input CTL model as there is no need to store the whole model beforehand. So, we obtain
Mod(CTL)log Mod(ARCTL). Since the explicit model is obtained as the product of the
components of a concurrent program and this product is at most exponentially larger than
the program, the state space is exponential in the length of the program. Consequently,
Con(CTL) p Con(ARCTL). Since any formula of CTL is also a formula of ARCTL
(existential CTL formulas Eϕ are Eεϕ ARCTL formulas
2) and Model checking CTL for
concurrent programs is proven to be PSPACE-hard in [58], the hardness of model checking
ARCTL in PSPACE follows.
To prove the upper bound complexity of ARCTL model checking in concurrent pro-
grams, we use reduction to GCTL∗ a generalized branching temporal logic with actions
[14].
Lemma 5.2. Model checking ARCTL for concurrent programs with respect to the size of
the local processes of these programs and the length of the formula being checked is in
PSPACE.
Proof. From Definitions 5.2 and 5.1, the models of ARCTL and GCTL∗ are similar, so we
can easily observe that a deterministic Turing machine can reduce the model of ARCTL
to the model of GCTL∗ by simply looking at the input and writing in the output tape the
same states, transitions, set of actions, and state and action valuation functions one by one.
Using a similar argument as in the proof of Lemma 5.1, we obtain Mod(ARCTL) log
2The soundness of this transformation is trivial, so the proof is omitted.
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Mod(GCTL∗) and thus Con(ARCTL)p Con(GCTL
∗). Let H be the reduction function
from ARCTL to GCTL∗ such that MαAR |= ϕ iff H (M
α
AR) |= H (ϕ). H (M
α
AR) is a GCTL
∗
model where SGC = SAR, IGC = IAR, ACGC = ACAR, TGC = TAR, VSGC =VSAR, and VAGC =
VAAR. For the common formulas in ARCTL and GCTL
∗, H is defined in the same way as
the function F . The reductions of the non-common formulas are as follows:
• H (EαXϕ) = E(Gα ∧Xϕ)
• H (Eα(ϕ U ψ)) = E(Gα ∧ϕ U ψ)
• H (EαGϕ) = E(Gα ∧Gϕ)
Soundness of this reduction follows from the semantics of the two languages. In ARCTL,
for EαXϕ to be satisfied, we need to find a path whose transition actions should satisfy
α and the next state of the path satisfies ϕ . In GCTL∗, this means the action formula α
should be global, so that it is satisfied by all the transition actions and Xϕ is satisfied in
the next state. The two other formulas follow the same reasoning. GCTL∗ turns out to be
then more expressive than ARCTL. It is obvious that a deterministic Turing machine can
compute these reductions polynomially in the size of the formulas. Consequently, ARCTL
p GCTL
∗. Thus, the membership in PSPACE follows from the facts that model checking
GCTL* is PSPACE-complete from [36], so in PSPACE, and complexity hierarchical classes
are inclusive.
Theorem 5.5. Model checking ARCTL is PSPACE-complete for concurrent programs with
respect to the size of the local processes of these programs and the length of the formula
being checked.
Proof. The proof is direct from Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2.
104
Lemma 5.3. Model checking CTLKC+ for concurrent programs with respect to the size
of the local processes of these programs and the length of the formula being checked is
PSPACE-hard.
Proof. CTL is a subset of CTLKC+ as CTLKC+ extends CTL with additional operators of
knowledge, commitment, and fulfilment. Thus, any model of CTL is a model of CTLKC+
and all CTL formulas are also CTLKC+ formulas. Consequently, the result follows from
CTLp CTLKC
+ and model checking CTL for concurrent programs is PSPACE-hard with
respect to the size of the local processes of these programs and the length of the formula
being checked [58].
Lemma 5.4. Model checking CTLKC+ for concurrent programs with respect to the size
of the local processes of these programs and the length of the formula being checked is in
PSPACE.
Proof. In Section 5.3, a reduction from CTLKC+ to ARCTL has been described. We can
imagine a deterministic Turing machine that looks in the input tape at the CTLKC+ model
and writes in the output tape, one by one, all the states and for each transition in the input
tape, a transition labeled by αo is written in the output tape. Moreover, for each ≈i accessi-
bility relation, a transition labeled by β i is written in the output tape. Finally, for each≈i→ j
accessibility relation in the input tape, a transition labeled by α i j and a reverse transition
labeled by γ i j are written in the output tape. Since there is no need to store the whole model,
this reduction can be computed in space log(n) where n is the size of the input model. Con-
sequently,Mod(CTLKC+)logMod(ARCTL) and thusCon(CTLKC
+)pCon(ARCTL)
(using the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 5.1). With regard to the formulas, the
transformation described in Section 5.3 is clearly polynomial in the size of the formula. As
a result, CTLKC+ p ARCTL. Therefore, the result flows from Theorem 5.1.
From Lemmas 5.3 and 5.4, the following theorem follows.
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Theorem 5.6. Model checking CTLKC+ is PSPACE-complete for concurrent programs
with respect to the size of the local processes of these programs and the length of the formula
being checked.
By computing the time and space complexity of the CTLKC+ logic, we answer the
seventh research question [Q7].
5.5 Case Study
In this section, we implement the reduction techniques presented in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 on
top of the CWB-NC and extended NuSMVmodel checkers to verify the interaction between
knowledge and commitment in MASs (Phase 4 of Figure 5.1). The case study for which
we have been able to carry out this motivation is the NetBill protocol [90]. This protocol
has been applied in many research work to show how to specify commitment protocols in
MASs ( see for example [35, 36, 104]).
5.5.1 Modeling the NetBill Protocol
The NetBill protocol is developed for buying and selling encrypted software goods on the
Internet [28, 90]. This protocol encompasses two interacting agents: the customer (Cus)
and the merchant (Mer) [67, 103]. To model the NetBill protocol using our transformation
tool, the designer should insert the local states of each agent, their actions, which agent
performs which action, what commitments, if any, hold in each state and where each of
those commitments is fulfilled. Based on these specifications, the global system is thereafter
generated automatically with the relevant epistemic and social accessibility relations. In
this protocol, the actions performed by agents are labeling the edges and modeled using the
notation Action and ‘Action to express, respectively, the sending and receiving of messages.
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The use of Action and ‘Action is to only distinguish who is performing the action. Thus, in
Figure 5.4 (the Customer model), when the customer agent performs an action, we model
it by the name of the action directly (e.g., Request, Accept, Reject, etc.). On the other hand,
when the merchant agent performs an action, we model it by ‘Action (e.g., ‘Quote, ‘Refund,
‘Receipt, etc.). In a similar way, in Figure 5.5, the notation Action is used for merchant’s
actions and the notation ‘Action is reserved for customer’s actions.
Figure 5.4 depicts the customer model. In this model, the customer (Cus) requests a
quote (i.e., action Request) from the merchant (Mer) for a certain goods at state c0. The
merchant replies to this request by presenting a quote for the requested goods at state c1
(i.e., action ‘Quote). The customer at state c2 can reject the offer (i.e., action Reject) and
the protocol moves to the initial state c0 after passing the failure state c4, or accept the
offer (i.e., action Accept), which means the customer commits to send the payment to the
merchant at state c3, formally, CCus→Mer Pay where Pay is the content of the commitment
and the customer should be aware of its commitment (i.e., KCus(CCus→MerPay)). After
that, if the customer accepts the offer, then it has two choices: (1) send the payment to
the merchant at state c5, which means that the customer fulfills its commitment (i.e., action
Payment), formally, Fu(CCus→Mer Pay); or (2) violates its commitment (action notPayment)
and the protocol moves to state c0 after passing state c4. When the merchant receives the
payment, it has two choices: (1) not delivering the goods (i.e., action ‘notDelivery) and
the protocol moves to the initial state c0 after refunding the customer (i.e., action ‘Refund)
at state c8; or (2) delivering the requested goods (i.e., action ‘Delivery) to the customer at
state c7, and then the protocol moves to the acceptance state c9 after sending the receipt
(i.e., action ‘Receipt) to the customer, and finally the protocol moves to c0. Moreover, the
atomic proposition p in states c1, c5, c6 and c7 is indicating that the customer is waiting for
an action from the merchant. For instance, in state c1, the customer is waiting to receive
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the quote and in state c7, it is waiting the receipt. The atomic proposition Init in state c0
is simply indicating that this state is the initial state. These two propositions will be used
































Figure 5.4: Customer model
Figure 5.5 depicts the Merchant model. In this model, if the merchant (Mer) receives
the payment from the customer (Cus) (i.e., action ‘Payment), after presenting the quote
(i.e., action Quote), then it commits towards the customer to deliver the required goods
at state m5 (i.e., CMer→CusDeliver) where Deliver is the content of the commitment. Fur-
thermore, the merchant should be aware of this commitment at the same state (m5) (i.e.,
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KMer(CMer→CusDeliver)). Thereafter, if the merchant delivers the goods (i.e., action Deliv-
ery), then it fulfills its commitment at state m7 (i.e., Fu(CMer→CusDeliver)) and it should
be aware of the content of the commitment (i.e., KMerDeliver). Then the protocol moves
to the acceptance state m9 after sending the receipt to the customer (i.e., action Receipt),
and finally the protocol moves to state m0, or it has to refund the customer (i.e., action Re-
fund) in case the delivery fails (i.e., action notDelivery). Similar to the customer model, the
atomic proposition q in states m0, m2 and m3 is indicating that the merchant is waiting for a































Figure 5.5: Merchant model
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5.5.2 Implementation
We have implemented the reduction technique (that transforms the problem of model check-
ing CTLKC+ into the problem of model checking GCTL∗) presented in Section 5.2 on top
of the automata-based model checker CWB-NC. Furthermore, we have implemented the re-
duction technique (that transforms the problem of model checking CTLKC+ into the prob-
lem of model checking ARCTL) presented in Section 5.3 on top of the extended NuSMV
model checker.
CWB-NC (ConcurrencyWorkBench of the NewCentury) is an automata-based model
checker. It has been used to model check different types of temporal logics (e.g., CTL,
CTL∗, and GCTL∗). This tool was developed at Stony Brook in the middle of 1990s. The
interesting feature of this tool is that it adopts an on-the-fly technique. In this technique,
the algorithm only searches the part of the state space relevant to a certain formula (i.e.,
the state space does not need to be constructed before). Recently, CWB-NC has been used
to verify commitment protocols [10, 34]. To use CWB-NC, we exploited the language
CCS [71] to encode the specification of the NetBill protocol and formalized by the model
M= (S, I,Rt ,{≈i |i ∈A },{≈i→ j |(i, j) ∈A
2},V ).
The two agents customer (Cus) and merchant (Mer) of the NetBill protocol are en-
coded in the language CCS by defining each agent as a set of processes. Each process
contains the local states of an agent. Technically, the commitment, fulfillment, and knowl-
edge states of each agent are defined as variables in the proc statement. Details about
encoding the NetBill protocol using CWB-NC can be found on the open source projects
web site SourceForge3.
On the other hand, NuSMV [22] is a symbolic-based model checker used to verify
both Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) [77] and Computation Tree Logic (CTL) [41]. It has
3https://sourceforge.net/projects/knowledgencommitment/files/NuSMV/?.
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been applied to model check various applications of MASs (e.g., Web-based services and
commitment protocols [36]). However, the original version of NuSMV does not support
verifying actions and knowledge properties in MASs. To overcome this limitation, the
extended version of NuSMV is developed [75]. Extended version of NuSMV can verify
ARCTL formulas and epistemic properties. In NuSMV, models are encoded using a lan-
guage called (extended SMV) [75]. To model ARCTL actions, Pecheur et al. [75] and
Lomuscio et al. [61] proposed to use existing NuSMV input variables. This model checker
can be downloaded online 4.
To implement our model M and CTLKC+ specifications using extended NuSMV,
we developed a JAVA Transformation Tool5 (JTT) as shown in Figure 5.6. This tool ac-
cepts, as input, a CTKLC+ model M and its specifications, then automatically generates
the equivalent extended NuSMV model and ARCTL specification using the proposed re-
duction technique presented in Section 5.3. After that, the extended NuSMVmodel checker
is used to verify the extended NuSMV model and ARCTL specifications. In this approach,
we only need to provide the tool with the model and specifications. After that, everything
will be done automatically.
Figure 5.7 illustrates the main components of coding the NetBill protocol in case of
one merchant and one customer as depicted in Figures 5.4 and 5.5. We have uploaded the
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Figure 5.6: Verification workflow
5.5.3 Verification Results
Our verification experiments were performed using a Toshiba Protégé computer with 2.00
GHz Intel Core Duo T6400 processor and 3GB memory under 64-bit Windows Vista Op-
erating System. We used extended NuSMV (NuSVM-ARCTL-TLACE7), which is based
on a modified version of NuSMV 2.2.2 that is able to model check ARCTL formulas. We
have reported the results of 8 experiments in Table 5.1. In this perspective, we started our
experiments with only two agents: the merchant (Mer) and customer (Cus) that interact in
a MAS to reason about their knowledge and commitments. In the second experiment, we
have added one more customer. Moreover, in the rest of our experiments, we added a new
agent each time up to 9 agents. In Table 5.1, number of reachable states (States), execu-
tion time (Time(sec)), and memory usage (Memory (MB)) are listed for various number of
7http://lvl.info.ucl.ac.be/Tools/NuSMV-ARCTL-TLACE
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agents. We have noticed that the state space increases exponentially as the number of agents
increases. However, memory usage increases only polynomially with the same number of
agents, which shows the efficiency of our model checking approach when the system scales
up (about 1.30413E+07 states).
Table 5.1: Verification results of the NetBill protocol using extended NuSMV
Agents States Time (sec) Memory (MB)
2 25 < 0.001 4.398
3 226 < 0.01 4.492
4 1,454 0.1 4.698
5 9,070 1.3 4.691
6 55,862 12.1 4.750
7 341,806 168.6 4.880
8 2,082,850 1753.5 4.969
9 1.30413E+07 27557.4 5.151
On the other hand, we also implemented the reduction technique in Section 5.2 and
applied it on the NetBill protocol using the CWB-NC automata-based model checker. The
verification results using this approach are shown in Table 5.2. From the scalability point
of view, we notice that the automata-based approach reaches the state explosion problem
relatively faster than the symbolic-based approach. As shown in Table 5.1, in the symbolic-
based approach, with 1.30413E+7 states and 9 agents, only 5.151 MB of memory is being
used. However, in the automata-based approach in Table 5.2, with only 54,439 states and 6
agents, a larger amount of memory (41.888MB) is needed. It is worth noticing that both the
number of states and memory usage in the automata-based technique (Table 5.2) increase
exponentially as we add more agents to the system up to 6 agents, after that the model goes
dramatically to the state explosion.
Another important motivation of this chapter is to use CTLKC+ to verify properties
of protocols that have interaction between knowledge and commitments. These properties
usually express some protocol requirements (specifications) that should be met. In fact,
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Table 5.2: Verification results of the NetBill protocol using CWB-NC
Agents States Transitions Memory (MB)
2 37 98 5.112
3 223 1023 5.212
4 1369 10,352 6.708
5 9,079 77,377 13.652
6 54,439 570,500 41.888
there have been large number of properties introduced in the literature [9, 10, 19, 29, 39,
72, 97]. In this section, we check Safety, Liveness, Reachability and Deadlock properties in
the NetBill protocol.
• Safety property.
Safety property insists on preventing the occurrence of “bad” behaviors (situations)
for a given modeled system (i.e., “Something bad will never occur”). For example,
the case that the customer (Cus) sends the payment to the merchant (Mer) (i.e., fulfills
its commitment), but the merchant does not know that. In this case, the merchant
could ask the customer to send the payment again until the merchant becomes aware
of that. This bad situation can be avoided using CTLKC+ as follows:
ϕ1 = AG ¬(Fu(CCus→MersendPayment)∧AG(¬KMersendPayment)).
A similar formula is when the customer fulfills its commitments, but it turns out that
it is not aware of:
ϕ2 = AG ¬(Fu(CCus→MersendPayment)∧AG(¬KCussendPayment)).
Another example of safety property is the case that, if a customer commits toward a
merchant to send its payment, then the customer should be aware of that. This can be
expressed as follows:
ϕ3 = AG ¬((CCus→MersendPayment)∧AG(¬KCus(CCus→MersendPayment))).
• Liveness property.
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This property insists on achieving the system “good” situation in future (i.e., “Some-
thing good will eventually happen”). From the NetBill protocol, we can consider
that case that: if the merchant commits to deliver the goods to the customer, it will
eventually deliver them, as a good situation that should be obtained. This property is
expressed as follows:
ϕ4 = AG(CMer→CusdeliverGoods→ EF Fu(CMer→CusdeliverGoods)).
• Reachability property.
This property highlights the fact that the system could reach a particular state (situ-
ation). For example, the merchant will eventually commit towards the customer to
deliver the required goods, which should be reached from the initial state. This prop-
erty can be expressed as follows:
ϕ5 = EFCMer→CusdeliverGoods
• Deadlock property.
As defined in [4], “a deadlock occurs if the complete system is in a terminal state, al-
though at least one component is in a (local) nonterminal state. The entire system has
thus come to a halt, whereas at least one component has the possibility to continue
to operate. A typical deadlock scenario occurs when components mutually wait for
each other to progress”. That is, the system is in a deadlock state if it reaches a state
in which no further progress could happen (halt state). To verify this property, we
defined two atomic propositions in Figure 5.7: DEF_cus.wait and DEF_mer.wait
to capture the cases where the customer is waiting for the merchant response and the
merchant is waiting for the customer response (see Section 5.5.2). For example, one
possible scenario of a deadlock that should be avoided in our system is the case that
the customer is waiting for a quote from the merchant, while the merchant is waiting
for a request from the customer at the same time, thus halting the entire system. This
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property can be expressed in CTLKC+ as follows: ϕ6 = AG ¬(p∧q)
Moreover, since the final states in our models depicted in Figures 5.4 and 5.5 are also
the initial states, we verify another instance of the deadlock property by checking
that all computations are visiting the initial states (i.e., c0 and m0) in the future. To
do so, we defined, in Figure 5.7, an atomic proposition DEF_Init which holds in
the initial sates. This atomic proposition is represented by Init in Figures 5.4 and
5.5. Consequently, if this property is satisfied, then the system will not come to a
halt, which entails that there is always a progress. This property can be expressed in
CTLKC+ as follows: ϕ7 = AG (EF (Init)).
We notice that all the formulas hold in the model as shown in Figure 5.8, meaning
that our approach is successful in expressing the protocol properties using CTLKC+ and
our reduction-based model checking techniques are working effectively.
5.6 Summary
In this chapter, we introduced two model checking techniques for verifying the logic of
knowledge and communicative commitments, CTLKC+. In those techniques, we devel-
oped a set of reduction rules to formally reduce the problem of model checking CTLKC+ to
the problem of model checking GCTL∗ and ARCTL respectively. Furthermore, we proved
the soundness of the proposed reduction techniques. The complexity of model checking
CTLKC+ using our reduction techniques is addressed as well. After that, the effectiveness
of the proposed techniques were evaluated through applying them on a real case study from
the e-business domain, namely the NetBill protocol, and then implementing the reduction
tools on top of the CWB-NC and extended NuSMV model checkers. We were successfully
able to check some desirable protocol properties expressed in CTLKC+.
116
In the next chapter, we will summarize the main contributions and present the future




cus : process Customer(mer);




DEFINE DEF_Pay := cus.state = c5 ;
DEFINE DEF_Deliver := cus.state = c7;
DEFINE DEF_cus.wait := (cus.state = c5 | cus.state = c6 | cus.state = c1 | cus.state = c7);
DEFINE DEF_mer.wait := (mer.state = m0 | mer.state = m2 | mer.state = m3);




SPEC AG !(EAX(cus.action=Gamma_cus)(AAX(cus.action=Alpha_cus)(AAX (cus.action=Beta_cus)(DEF_Pay) & 
AAX(mer.action=Beta_mer)(DEF_Pay))|EAX(cus.action=Beta_cus)(EAX(cus.action=Gamma_cus)(AAX(cus.action=Al
pha_cus)(AAX (cus.action=Beta_cus)(DEF_Pay) & AAX(mer.action=Beta_mer)(DEF_Pay))))
|EAX(mer.action=Beta_mer)(EAX(mer.action=Gamma_mer)(AAX(cus.action=Alpha_cus)(AAX 




-- The definition of Customer Agent (cus, mer)
-----------------------------------------
MODULE Customer (arg1,arg2)
VAR state : {c0,c1,c2,c3,c4,c5,c6,c7,c8,c9};
IVAR action : {Request, Accept, Reject, Null, notPayment, Payment, Alpha_cus, Beta_cus, Gamma_cus};
INIT (state = c0)
TRANS(next(state)= case
(state = c0 & arg1.action = Request) : c1;
(state = c1 & arg2.action = Quote) : c2;
(state = c2 & arg1.action = Accept) : c3;
(state = c2 & arg1.action = Reject) : c4;
(state = c3 & arg1.action = notPayment) : c4;
(state = c3 & arg1.action = Payment) : c5;
(state = c3 & arg1.action = Alpha_cus) : c5;
(state = c3 & arg1.action = Beta_cus) : c3;
(state = c4 & arg1.action = Null) : c0;
(state = c5 & arg2.action = Delivery) : c7;
(state = c5 & arg2.action = notDelivery) : c6;
(state = c5 & arg1.action = Beta_cus) : c5;
(state = c5 & arg1.action = Gamma_cus) : c3;
(state = c6 & arg2.action = Refund) : c8;
(state = c7 & arg2.action = Receipt) : c9;
(state = c8 & arg1.action = Null) : c0;
(state = c9 & arg1.action = Null) : c0;
esac)
-----------------------------------------
-- The definition of Merchant Agent (mer,cus)
-----------------------------------------
MODULE Merchant (arg1,arg2)
VAR state : {m0,m1,m2,m3,m4,m5,m6,m7,m8,m9}; 
IVAR action : {Quote, Delivery, notDelivery, Receipt, Beta_mer, Alpha_mer, Gamma_mer, Null, Refund};
INIT (state = m0)
TRANS(next(state)= case
(state = m0 & arg2.action = Request) : m1;
(state = m1 & arg1.action = Quote) : m2;
(state = m2 & arg2.action = Accept) : m3;
(state = m2 & arg2.action = Reject) : m4;
(state = m3 & arg2.action = notPayment) : m4;
(state = m3 & arg2.action = Payment) : m5;
(state = m4 & arg1.action = Null) : m0;
(state = m5 & arg1.action = Alpha_mer) : m7;
(state = m5 & arg1.action = Delivery) : m7;
(state = m5 & arg1.action = notDelivery) : m6;
(state = m5 & arg1.action = Beta_mer) : m5;
(state = m6 & arg1.action = Refund) : m8;
(state = m7 & arg1.action = Beta_mer) : m7;
(state = m7 & arg1.action = Receipt) : m9;
(state = m7 & arg1.action = Gamma_mer) : m5;
(state = m8 & arg1.action = Null) : m0;
(state = m9 & arg1.action = Null) : m0;
esac)
Figure 5.7: Coding the NetBill protocol
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Figure 5.8: Screenshot of verification results for the NetBill protocol
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
In this chapter, we conclude the thesis by highlighting the main contributions and listing
the possible directions of future work.
6.1 Conclusions
In this thesis, we have developed a practical and formal approach that analyzes the in-
teraction between knowledge and communicative social commitments in MASs from the
semantics, soundness and completeness, model checking and complexity perspectives. In
particular, the main contributions of this thesis are:
1. Developing a new consistent logic called the logic of knowledge and commitments
(CTLKC+) that captures the interaction between knowledge and social commitments
in MASs. To do so, a new combined temporal logic, called CTLKC, is first intro-
duced. The purpose of such a combination is to express and figure out some reasoning
postulates merging both knowledge and commitments as they are currently defined in
the literature. By analyzing the postulates, we identified some paradoxes that should
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be addressed in any consistent logic combining these two modalities. Thus, to over-
come and solve the paradoxes identified in CTLKC, we introduced CTLKC+ which
can be used to reason about knowledge, communicative social commitment and their
interactions in a consistent manner [2].
2. Proving the soundness and completeness of CTLKC+ using correspondence theory
for modal logic. To do so, we developed a set of reasoning postulates that captures the
interactions between knowledge and social commitments in MASs and corresponded
them to certain classes of frames providing the required proofs. Consequently, we
proved that the logic generated by any subset of these postulates is sound and com-
plete with respect to the models that are based on the corresponding frames [1].
3. Introducing two transformation-based model checking techniques for verifying CTLKC+
[2, 3]. In particular, we transformed the problem of model checking CTLKC+ into the
problem of model checking GCTL∗ (a generalized version of CTL∗ with action for-
mulas) and ARCTL (the combination of CTL with action formulas). Concretely, we
constructed a set of transformation rules to formally reduce the CTLKC+ model into
GCTL∗ and ARCTL models and the CTLKC+ formulas into GCTL∗ and ARCTL
formulas. Furthermore, we proved the soundness of the transformation techniques.
4. Developing a Java Transformation Tool (JTT)1 that automatically performs the trans-
formation process from the CTLKC+ logic into the extended NuSMV logic. JTT
accepts, as input, a CTLKC+ model M and its specifications, then generates the
equivalent extended NuSMV model and ARCTL specification.
5. Computing the time and space complexity of the proposed model checking proce-
dures [3]. This analysis confirms that the complexity of CTLKC+ model checking
1https://github.com/Marooned202/jtl
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for concurrent programs with respect to the size of the components of those programs
and the length of the formula being checked is PSPACE-complete. From the time
perspective, we proved that the complexity of the proposed approaches is P-complete
with regard to the size of the model and length of the formula.
6. Implementing the proposed model checking techniques on top of the CWB-NC and
extended NuSMV model checkers [3]. By so doing, we were successfully able to
check some desirable properties for the NetBill protocol, a real case study from the e-
business domain, expressed in CTLKC+ and report verification results. The obtained
results show the effectiveness of our model checking approaches when the system
scales up.
6.2 Future Work
As future work, we intend to extend the proposed approach by addressing the following
issues:
• Developing dedicated model checking algorithms for CTLKC+ logic and implement-
ing them on top of the MCMAS+ symbolic model checker [7]. By so doing, we will
be able to compare the verification results of both techniques (i.e., the reduction and
model checking algorithms).
• Extending our java transformation tool to be a Graphical User Interface (GUI) tool
and be able to perform transformation for more model checking problems.
• Integrating conditional social commitments in our approach. Thus, we will be able to
study the interaction between knowledge and conditional social commitments from
different perspectives.
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• Introducing a new consistent logic for group social commitments. Therefore, we will
be able to reason about many-to-one, one-to-many and many-to-many commitments.
• Investigating the interaction between group knowledge (i.e., every body in group
knows, distributed knowledge and common knowledge) and group social commit-
ments in MASs. The ultimate objective is to cover all possible interactions between
knowledge and communicative social commitment in MASs.
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